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INTRODUCTION 
Consider two seemingly diverse scenarios recently addressed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court: Fundamentalist Christian students sue their universities for 
giving some of their mandatory activity fees to ideologically liberal student 
organizations; 1 politicians and politiclll action committees across the ideological 
. 
• Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. B.A., 1982, 
Wesleyan University; J.D., 1985, University of Michigan. 
I. See Southworth v. Grebe, No. 98-1189, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2196 ( Mar. 22, 2000), rev 'g 
151 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Anne-Marie Cusac, Suing for Jesus: A New Legal Team 
Wants to Cleanse the Campuses for Christ, THE PROGRESSIVE, Apr. I, 1997, at 30 (describing the 
Southworth v. Grebe litigation, noting that all three plaintiffs are fundamentalist Christians and that 
the litigation is funded by the Alliance Defense Fund, which in its newsletter noted th.at student fee 
funding of"groups th.at advocate radical feminism, abortion, and homose~uality" is objectionable 
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spectrum challenge restrictions on the way they can collect and spend their 
money. 2 The link between these two types of claims has not been obvious, but 
indeed exists at a fundamental level. The question central to resolving both types 
of claims is the scope of the government's discretion to redistribute speech 
resources for the purpose of creating a public forum.3 The Court identified this 
question in resolving the recent student activity fee challenge,4 but not in 
addressing campaign finance issue.5 The linkage between the claims thus 
remains unnoted. 
One aspect of this linkage is the government purpose . In both types of cases 
the government can claim that its purpose is not only consistent with, but 
affirmatively serves, free speech clause values . Universities across the country 
"operate against a background and tradition of thought and experiment that is at 
the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition .',6 They thus view it 
as their "business ... to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to 
speculation, experiment and creation." 7 The purpose of the student activity fees 
funding mechanism is to promote diversity of expression on campus by making 
it possible for a broader range of speakers to participate than could if their speech 
because the groups "promote values and take actions contradictory to Christian beliefs"). 
2. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov 't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897 (2000) (Republican candidate for 
state auditor and a political action committ~e that wanted to contribute more to him sued to enjoin -
enforcement of a campaign contribution limit). Similar cases have involved different plaintiffs. 
See, e.g., California Prolife Council Political Action Comm. v. Scully, 989 F. Supp. 1282, 1286 
(E.D. Cal . 1998) (listing plaintiffs as including the California Democrati c Party, the California 
Republican Party and numerous unions, as well as the named political action committee), aff' d, 164 
F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 1999). These and other challenges to campaign contribution limits occur 
against the background of the Court's decision in .Buckley v. Valeo, 404 U.S. 1 (1976), which 
interpreted the Constitution to permit some contribution limits but generally not to permit 
restrictions on expenditures. l 
3. See Rounds v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ ., 166 F.3d 1032, 1040 n.S (9th Cir. 
1999) (deciding in a student activ ity fees challenge whether "a public university may ... 
constitutionally establish and fund a limited public forum for the expression of diverse 
viewpoints."); C. Edwin Balcer, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. I, 33 (1998)(arguing that the Supreme Court 's decision in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber 
of Commerce, 494 U.S. 6S2 (1990), "implic itly accepts the view that campaign speech is part of a 
legally structured , institutional realm in which speech can be regulated-in this case, a sphere that 
can be opened to the views of people but (partially } closed to those of corporations-in order to 
improve the democrat ic character of elections"). 
4. See Southworth, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2196, at • 31 (university through fee funding 
mechanism "may create what is tantamount to a li1111ited public forum"). 
S. See Shrink, 120 S. Ct at 905-09 (addressing government purpose o f preventing 
corruption and the appearance of corruption). 
6. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 , 836 (1995). 
7. Rounds, 166 F.3d at 1038 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 
( 1957) (Frankfurter , ] ., concurring) (quoting THE OPEN UNIVERSITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 10-12 (a 
statement of a conference of Senior scholars from South Africa))). 
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opportunities depended solely on the money they could generate in the private 
economic market.8 
Similarly, federal and state governments are charged with structuring and 
running elections that comport with constitutional and democratic ideals.9 Full 
expression from a wide range of speakers about self-government issues is at the 
core of free speech clause protection.10 To the extent that campaign finance 
regulations could seek to "restrict the speech of some elements of our society in 
order to enhance the relative voice of others"11 their purpose would beto promote 
a more full exposition of viewpoints on electoral issues than occurs in a speech 
market that mirrors the distribution of money in the private economy.12 This 
Article argues that recognizing the government's purpose as creating and 
structuring a public forum means that such an equalizing purpose could comport 
with the free speech guarantee. 
Another aspect of this linkage is the nature of the free speech clause claim. 
In both the student activity fees and campaign finance challenges the claim was 
that the Constitution limits the government's ability to redistribute speech 
resources even for a purpose that may seem to serve free speech clause values.13 
In the fee redistribution context, students unsuccessfully argued that such "life-
support" for groups that "cannot survive in the marketplace of ideas" violated 
their free speech rights. 14 In the campaign finance context, the Court has· held 
that regulations aimed at "equalizing the relative ability ofindividuals and groups 
to influence the outcome of elections" violate the Constitution because "[t]he 
8. See Rosenberger, SIS U.S. at 834 (stating that the purpose of student activity fees forum 
is "to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers"). 
9. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198-99 (1992)(rccognizing State's compelling 
interests in "[p Jrotccting the right ofits citizens to vote freely for the candidates of their choice" and 
"protect[ing) the right to vote in an election conducted with integrity and reliability"). 
10. See id ("Whatever differences may exist about interpretation of the First Amendment, 
there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the 
free discussion of governmental affairs." (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966))). 
11. Id. at 48-49. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to forbid such an 
equalizing purpose .. See id. at 49-SO. But see Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897, 
912 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that Buckley's words "cannot be taken literally" 
because "[t]he Constitution often permits restrictions on the speech of some in order to prevent a 
few from drowning out the many."). 
12. See Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A ConstiMiona/ Principle of 
Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1204 (1994) (arguing for an "equal-dollars-per-
voter" rule because "wealthy citi:zens should not be permitted to have a greater ability to participate 
in the electoral process simply on account of their greater wealth."). 
13. See Southworth v. Grebe, No. 98-1189, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2196, at •26 ( Mar. 2Z, 2000) 
(noting "the important and substantial purposes of the University. which seeks to facilitate a wide 
range of speech"), rev'g lSl F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1998); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) 
(rejecting "ancillary governmental interest in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and 
groups to influence the out.come of elections" as a justification for expenditure limits). 
14. Cusac, supra note l, at 30. 
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First Amendment's protection against governmental abridgment of free 
expression cannot properly be made to depend on a person's financial ability to 
engage in public discussion." 15 Despite the different results, however, the basic 
outline of the claimed individual speech right in both instances is the same: that 
the free speech guarantee grants individuals speech power in the "marketplace 
of ideas" in proportions that mirror their shares of economic resources in the 
private financial marlcet.16 To the extent that this claimed right is indeed 
contained within the Constitution, it would allow individuals to veto collective 
action aimed at augmenting speech opportunities by equalizing them. 
This link between the issues-the common government purpose and the same 
claimed individual right to thwart it-sheds new light on both of thent. Crucial 
to understanding both is a definition of the scope of the government's discretion 
to choose to regulate individuals' money for the purpose of creating and 
structuring a public forum. This Article provides such a definition. 
Part I spells out the boundaries of the controversies that underlie the recent 
cases, noting that they raise the same fundamental constitutional question of the 
government's ability to redistribute speech resources to create a public forum . 
Part II examines the specifics of this linkage. Part Il.A notes that in both 
controversies the claimed individual speech right depends upon equating 
government regulation of money with such regulation of speech. Part Il.B 
identifies the common government purpose of creating and structuring a public 
forum. Part II.C examines the different government means of compelling as 
opposed to restricting spending. This subpart concludes that while the means 
may make some difference in the constitutional "inquiry, they are not the crux of 
the analysis . 
Part Ill identifies and examines the factors relevant to resolving the 
appropriate scope of government action in both contexts. Part IIl.A looks at the 
government purposes that can justify speech market adjustment. Subparts 
examine the government purposes to encourage diverse expression, to promote 
fair deliberation and decision making, and to protect disfavored speakers, 
concluding that each of these purposes can justify redistributing private speech 
resources. Part III.B spells out effects that can invalidate speech-conscious 
governmental action. Subparts discuss the dangers of government favoritism, 
distorting public perceptions, and silencing speakers in the process of 
encouraging greater participation in the speech market. While all of these 
dangers are real and may exist intolerably in any particular case, these subparts 
note that both student activity fee distribution systems and campaign finance 
regulations can be structured to minimize these effects and thus enhance the 
constitutionality of the government action. 
Part IV applies the analysis to both issues. Part IV.A discusses student 
15. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49. 
16. See id. at 50 (rejecting expenditure limits as inconsistent with the free speech guarantee); 
Cusac, supra note 1, at 30, 32 (quoting the president of the Alliance Defense Fund, which financed 
the Southworth litigation, as stating that groups threatened by a loss of student activity fee funding 
"ought to get better at the marketing business"). 
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activity fee funding mechanisms, explaining the multiple reasons why the fact 
that fees are distributed to a wide range of student groups strongly supports the 
constitutionality of the mechanism. Part IV.B discusses campaign finance 
regulations. It notes that the government purpose of structuring full and fair 
debate on electoral issues should be strong enough in theory to support both 
contribution and spending 17 restrictions. Problems will most likely be in the 
proof. The government must prove a purpose to enhance free speech clause 
values, as opposed to thwart them by, for example, covertly favoring the 
incumbents who usually must participate in enacting the regulations. It also must 
address the difficult question of what level of restriction serves its diversity and 
fair deliberation purposes while not squelching expression in the process, 
although it should have some discretion to choose what this point is. 
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
A. Mandatory Student Activity Fees 
In addition to tuition, which is mandatory and funds the many aspects of 
classroom learning, most universities also require students to pay "activity 
fees."ta The purpose of such additional assessments is to fund activities outside 
the classroom that further the universities' educational missions. 19 Although the 
specifics of the amounts and methods of distribution vary,20 such fees typically 
provide funds to run student govemment,21 to create and circulate student 
17. The Court bas upheld contribution limits as justified by other government purposes 
relating to corruption and the appearance of corruption. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 
S. Ct. 897, 902 (2000); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27. Thus the primary application of this alternate 
public forum purpose is to justify expenditure limits which require more compelling justification 
than contribution limits. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 904. Neverthel.ess, the public forum purpose 
should serve as an additional justification for contribution restrictions as well. See id. at 911 
(Breyer & Ginsberg, IJ., concurring) ( .. (B]y limiting the size of the largest contributors, such 
restrictions aim to democratize the influence that money itself may bring to bear upon the electoral 
process."). 
18. See DAVID L. MEABON ET AL., SnJDENT ACTIVITY FEES: A LEGAL AND NATIONAL 
PERsPECTIVE 24 (1979) (9()0/o f universities fund student activities with mandatory fees). 
19. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 824 (1995) 
("(T)he purpose of the (University of Virginia Student Activities Fund) is to support a broad range 
of extracurricular student activities that 'are related to the educational purpose of the University.'" 
(quoting App. to Pet for Cert. 6la)) . 
20. See Southworth v .. Grebe, No. 98-ll89, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2196, at• 10-11 (Mar. 22, 
2000) (student activity fee for the 1995-1996 academic year was $331.50; Regents control 
distribution of one portion, student body controls di~bution of the portion to student groups, 
subjectto Regents' approval), rev'g I 51 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1998); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 824 
(student activity fee is $14 per semester; student council has initial authority to disburse funds, but 
its actions are reviewable by a faculty body). 
21. See, e.g., Southworth, 151 F.3d at 717 ("[F]ees fund ... the Associated Students of 
Madison budget"); Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500 (Cal. 1993) (noting that 
.. 
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publications, 22 and to pay for some or all of the activities conducted by a range 
of student organizations. 23 
The organizations funded are typically composed of students unh~d by a 
common interest or pursuit.2'1 These unifying features may include academics,2S 
recreation, 26 religious belief, 27 recognition and celebration of culture,2-8 
ethnicity, 29 or sexual orientation, 30 or discussion and advocacy with respect to 
particular social issues. 31 Some of these student groups are affiliated with state, 
national, or international organizations. 32 
The recent case before the Court centered around a university's authority to 
allocate a portion of mandatory student activity fees to student groups that 
proceeds of University of California student fees "support a wide variety of activities in addition 
to student government"). 
22. See, e.g ., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 822 ( describing the university's authorization of"the 
payment of outside contractors for the printing costs of a variety of student publications"); Kania 
v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 47S, 476 (4th Cir. 1983) (student fees fund The Daily Tar Heel at the 
University of North Carolina). 
23. See Southworth, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2196, at• 11 (during the 1995-1996 school year fees 
funded 623 groups); Rounds v. Oregon State Bd. of Educ., 166 F.3d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(fees fund "[o]ver eighty University organiz.ations, including athletic, culturally-oriented, and 
political group's"). 
24. See Dave Newhart, College StudenJ Fees Face First AmendmenJ Test, CH.I. TRIB., June 
4, 1997, § 1, at 17 ("[F]ees . .. go to special-interest groups such as chess clubs, black student 
unions, Asian-American associations and food science clubs."). 
25. See Smith, 844 P.2d at 504 ("Most of the registered student groups [funded with activity 
fees] arc devoted to academic, cultural, or recreational pursuits. The Physics Students Society [is 
a] random, typical examplcQ .... ). . 
26. See Southworth, 1 St F.3d at 719 (nonallocable portion of student fees cover"the first 
and second year of the Recreational Sports budget''); Smith, 844 P.2d at 504. 
27. See Rosenberger, 51 S U.S. at 84 7 (interpreting Constitution to require university to fund 
Wide Awake : A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia when the university funded a 
wide range ofother student publications); Rounds, 166 F.3d at 1039 ( organizations funded include 
the Muslim Student Association and the Jewish Student Union). 
28. See Smith, 844 P.2d at 504 (''typical student group;' is the Spanish Club); Rounds, 166 
F.3d at 1034 ("culturally-oriented" student groups receive fee funding). 
29. See Newhart, supra note 24, at 17 (groups funded include "black student unions [and] 
Asian-American associations"). 
30. See Southworth, l 51 F.3d at 720 (the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual Campus Center receives 
fees funding); Smith, 844 P.2d at 504 (Gay and Lesbian League rec.cives fees funding). 
31. These causes vary widely and can include such causes as environmental preservation, 
see Smith, 844 P.2d at 504 (student affiliates of the Sierra Club), AIDS awarcness,see Southworth, 
1 SI F.3d at 702 (fees fund the Madison AIDS Support Network), and to promote "sensitivity to and 
tolerance of Christian viewpoints," Rosenberger , 51 S U.S. at 826-27 (noting that this is the purpose 
of Wide Awake Productions, a student group entitled to funding by student fees). 
32. For example, student organimtions such as AmnestY International, Greenpeace, and the 
National Organiz.ation for Women have national affiliates. 
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engaged in "political or ideological" expression that conflicted with the personal 
beliefs of the student plaintiffs forced, through the fee mechanism, to fund it.33 
On the one hand, the Court had held that in some instances universities must fund 
student groups ' ideological speech.34 Specifically, where a university funds a 
wide range 'of student publications, the free speech clause of the First 
Amendment prohibits the school from discriminating against those that express 
a religious ideology. 3' On the other hand, in the context of compul sory union 
security fees36 and attorney bar dues,37 the Court had interpreted the Constitution 
to place limits on the gov~rnment's use of dissenters ' fees to fund special 
activities. Specifically, in both of those instances , the Court had held that the 
Constitution limits the use of mandatory monetary exact ions from individuals to 
expressive activities "gennane " to the government's purpose for creating the 
organization and compelling the payments to it.38 These decisions , in turn, were 
extensions of the Court's holding that the First Amendment " freedom of speech" 
guarantee includes the right not to speak.39 As the right to "co ntribut[ e] to an 
33. Southworth, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2196 , at •19 (cit ing Southworth, 151 F.3d at 73 1, 735). 
34. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834 (''University may not discriminate based on the 
viewpoint of private persons whose speech it facilitates" when it "expends funds to encourage a 
diversity of views from private speakers."). 
3S. See id at 819 (invali dating a prohibition on funding a publication that '" primar ily 
promotes or manifests a particular belie[fJ in or about a deity or an ultimate reality '" as 
discriminatory when university funds wide range of other publications (quoting App. to Pet. for 
Cert. 61a}). 
Prior to the recent decision , e-0urts had differed on the extent to which the Constitution 
prohibited mandatory student fees to be used to fund educational activities that include political or 
ideological speec h. Compare Rounds v. Oregon State Bd . of Educ., 166 F.3d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir . 
1999) (use of student activity fees at University of Oregon to fund Oregon Student Public Interest 
Group Education Fund (OSPIRG EF) is constitutional where funding creates a "diverse ... limited 
public forum" and separate education fund "limits university funding to educational activities," 
which may include political speech , rather than the " legislative lobbying and more overtly political 
action " engaged in by the paren t, nonstudent OSPIRG}, with Southworth, ISi P.3d at 732 ("The 
First Amendment is offended by the Regents' use of objecting students' fees to subsidize 
organiu.tions which engage in political and ideological activities" regardless of whether the funding 
is gennane to the universities' mission in that it creates a public forum for diverse expression. "). 
36. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ. , 431 U.S . 209 {1977). 
37. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal ., 496 U .S. 1 (1990). 
38. Id. at 13. 
Abood held that a union could not expend a dissenting individual 's dues for ideological 
activities not 'germane' to the purpose for which compelled association was justified: 
collective bargaining .. .. The State B:ar may therefore constitutionally fund activities 
gennane to [its] goals out of the mandatory dues of all members. It may not, however , 
in such manner fund activities of an ideological nature which fall outside of those areas 
of activity. · 
Id at 13·14 (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 23S) . 
39. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 634 ( 1943) (rejecting the 
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organization for the purpose of spreading a political message is protected by the 
First Amendment,'>40 so, too, is the right to refrain from making such 
contributions.41 
Because of the similarity of compelled contribtJtions, courts had applied the 
analysis drawn from the union and bar due cases to answer the student activity 
fees controversy, 41 reaching conflicting resu Its. 43 The conflicts illustrated that the 
gennaneness test is not self-defining.44 Rather, it requires a judgment about the 
closeness of the relationship between an organization's activities and its 
legitimate mission.45 Moreover, because there are degrees of "gennaneness,"46 
this judgment must include an assessment of the free speech clause interests on 
both sides of the controversy.47 The problem with lifting the analysis from the 
previous mandatory payment cases and applying it to the student fees issue is that 
the surface similarity between the cases obscures constitutionally significant 
differences between the types of cases. 
proposition that "a Bill of Rights which guards the individual's right to speak his own mind, left 
it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind."); Wooley v. Maynard, 
430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) ("The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking arc 
complementary components of the broader concept of 'individual freedom of mind."' (quoting 
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637)). 
40. Abood, 431 U.S. at 235 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I (1976)). 
4 I . See id. ("The fact that the appel I ants arc compelled to make, rather than prohibited from 
making, contributions for political purposes worlcs no less an infringement of their constitutional 
rights."). 
42. See, e.g., Rounds v. Oregon State Bd. ofEduc., 166 F.3d 1032, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 1999) 
("We do not confront these issues in a vacuum, for the Supreme Court has already constructed the 
analytical framework for our examination," citing the gennaneness test from Abood and Keller); 
Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 723 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting the need to apply a "germaneness 
analysis"), rev 'd, No. 98-1189, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2196 (March 22, 2000). 
43. See Southworth, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2196, at •20 (noting "conflicting results" in lower 
courts); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., SIS U.S. 819, 851 (1995) 
(O'Connor, I. , concurring) (noting "a split in the lower courts'' with respect to the application of 
the Abood/Keller analysis to student activity fees). 
44. See Southworth, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2196, at *27 (noting that "it is difficult to define 
germane speech with ease or precision where a union or bar association is the party, [and] the 
standard becomes all the more unmanageable in the public university setting."); see also Rounds, 
166 F.3d at 1037 ("These principles are easily described in theory: application is a more operose 
task."); Southworth, 151 F.3d at 723-24 ("Abood did not provide much guidance as to its actual 
application . .. . Keller still left many lines to be drawn."). 
45. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 15 (1990) (noting that the gennaneness of 
activities to an organization's purpose will fall on a "spectrum"). 
46. See Southworth, 1 S 1 F.3d at 727 (rejecting a "broad reading of gennaneness")(citation 
omitted). 
47. See Rounds, 166 F.3d at 1039 (noting that in the context of student activity fees the 
goals of the university in compelling payments "arc inextricably connected with the underlying 
policies of the First Amendment"). 
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The difference relied upon by the Court in rejecting application of the 
germaneness standard to the student fee context is the "vast unexplored bounds" 
of the speech public universities seek to encourage. 48 A more precise way of 
stating this difference between the cases that is crucial to the constitutional 
analysis is that in previous cases, the government created an organization to serve 
a primarily nonspeech function. 49 In several ways this primarily nonspeech 
governmental purpose supported !l constitutional interpretation limiting the use 
of mandatory payments for speech. First, the government did not have positive 
free speech interests inherent in the collective purpose to hold up against the free 
speech interests of dissenters.so Second, excising some tangential speech 
activities to serve the interests of individual dissenters did not significantly 
undermine the collective purpose.st Third, because the government purpose was 
to fund a single organization dedicated to pursuing a nonspeech objective, the 
speech incidentally funded would be of one viewpoint chosen by those who had 
majority control of the government-created organization.s 2 The effect of 
compulsory funding of such speech would therefore be to redirect private speech 
resources from minority to majority viewpoints, skewing the marketplace of 
ideas in a way most inimical to free speech clause values.53 This combination of 
48. Southworth, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2196, at *27. 
49. See Keller, 496 U.S. at 13 ("[T)he compelled association and integrated bar are justified 
by the State's interest in regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal 
services.") ; Abood v. Detroit Bel. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 226-27 (1977) (legitimate purpose of 
union is to engage in "collective bargaining. contract administration, and grievance adjustment"). 
SO. Compare Keller, 496 U.S. at 14 ("[T)he guiding standard must be whether the 
challenged expenditures are necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of regulating the 
legal profession or 'improving the quality of the legal service available to the people of the 
State."'), with Rounds, 166 F.3d at I 038 ("In assessing purpose , it is of the utmost significance that 
the organizational speech at issue occurs in an academic setting, for '[i]t is the business of a 
university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and 
creation."' (quoting Sweezy v. State, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(quoting CONFERENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNIV. OF CAPE TOWN & THE UNIV. OF 
WITS WA TERRANO, THE OPEN UNIVERSITlES IN SOUTI! AFRICA I 0-12 ( l 957)) )). 
SI. See Keller, 496 U.S . at 16 (while "[c]ompulsory dues may not be expended to endorse 
or advance a gun control or nuclear weapons freeze initiative[,] ... petitioners have no valid 
constitutional objection to their compulsory dues being spent for activities connected with 
disciplining members of the Bar or proposing ethical codes for the profession."); Abood, 431 U.S. 
at236 (noting that the constitutional inquiry involves "drawing lines between collective-bargaining 
activities, for which contributions may be compelled, and ideological activities unrelated to 
collective bargaining, for which such compulsion is prohibited"). 
52. See Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475, 480 (4th Cir. 1983) (''In Abood the plaintiffs 
alleged that they had no control over the Union's communications, and that these communications 
were one-sided presentations of the 'Union 's viewpoint "' (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 275 
(Powell, J., concurring))) . 
53. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) ("The First Amendment 
generally prevents government from proscribing speech [because] of disapproval of the ideas 
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f~ctors-{ I) a primary nonspeech collective · purpose, (2) speech activities 
tangentially related to it (and therefore dispensable), and (3) a majority 
viewpoint-discriminatory speech market impact-explain the existence of the 
individual right to thwart collective speech activities in the context of 
organizations that serve nonspeech governmental objectives. 54 
Both the governmental purpose and the marketplace of ideas impact of the 
speech funded differ in the context of student activity fees. Universities frankly 
acknowledge that their purpose in compelling fees to support organizations that 
may engage in political or ideological activities is to create a public forum for 
speech and debate to supplement that w~ich would exist were student speech to 
depend solely on private funding .ss Thus, where creating a public forum is the 
purpose, 56 funding speech in the university context is not incidental to some other 
nonspeech objective. Funding speech is the objective. While this purpose would 
render the government action highly suspect if carried out in a way that exhibited 
official favoritism of particular points ofview,57 the universities argued that the 
neutral funding of a wide range of viewpoints within the created forum s 
enhances, rather than endangers, free speech clause values. 58 Because of the free 
speech clause value inherent in the government purpose of creating a forum,59 
limiting the permissible speech funding would both significantly undermine the 
expressed."). 
54. But see Nonnan L. Cantor, Forced Payments to Service Institutions and Constitutional 
Interests in Ideological Non-Association, 36 RUTGERS L.REv. 3, 6-7 (1983) (arguing "Abood and 
cases akin to it are essentially askew .... The constitutional issues genuinely at stake d,o not 
preclude the collection of service fees from idoologically offended payors. "). 
55. See Rounds, 166 F.3d at I 039 (by funding a "broad range of extracurricular activities 
that are related to the educational purpose of the University," the University has "created a limited 
public forum ... that encourages ' a diversity of views from private speakers"' (citing Rosenberger 
v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., SI 5 U.S. 819, 824, 830, 834 (1995))); Kania, 702 F.2d 
at 477 (the student newspaper funded by student activity fees serves "the state's legitimate interest 
in creating the richest possible educational environmel\t at the University and, in its role as a forum 
for the expression of differing viewpoints, is a vital instrument of the University's 'marketplace of 
ideas."'). 
56. This Article deals with instances where creating and public speech forum is at least one 
of the university's purposes. Where this is not one of the purposes, as where a university funds the 
organiz.ation to provide educational benefits to its students, this analysis may not apply. See, e.g., 
Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060 (1985). 
57. See Rosenberger, SIS U.S. at 830-31 (when the government creates a limited public 
forum, it may engage in content discrimination to the extent necessary to preserve the purposes of 
the forum, but it may not engage in viewpoint discrimination). 
58. See, e.g., Kania, 702 F.2d at 480 (the student newspaper"increases the ovenll exchange 
of infonnation, ideas, and opinions on the campus"). 
59. See Carroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991, IOOt (2d Cir. 1992) ("A university's interest in 
maintaining a thriving campus forum ... is itself a concern of constitutional dimensions, since the 
central purp,ose of the First Amendment is to guarantee the free interchange of views and energetic 
debate.j. 
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government purpose 60 and disserve free speech clause values. 61 Additionally , 
unlike previous cases, the effect of the compulsory funding is not to skew the 
marketplace of ideas toward a majority-chosen point of view. 62 All of these 
reasons explain the Court's decision to distinguish an individual student's 
constitutional claim to opt out of financially supporting . certain expressive 
activities within the forum from the claims of public employees or state attorneys 
that political speech and lobbying by their respective organizations violate the 
free speech guarantee. 
But these are not the only difference .s between the previous compelled 
funding cases and the recent challenges to the use of student activity fees. 
Another crucial difference not noted by the Court in its recent decision 
complicates the constitutional ~alysis. In particular, characterizing the 
university funding schemes as "neutral," 63 while true in the sense that funding 
does not depend upon the viewpoi~t of the organizations' intended expression, 64 
hides a crucial aspect of both the purpose and effect of creating the fee forum . 
Universities claim the right of a collective majority to choose as a common 
purpose promoting, through the ex~nditure of collective resources, diverse , 
including nonmajority, expression.' To fulfill this purpose the universities 
collect resources from students with majority points of view and redirect them 
to students with minority viewpoints. So, while the government action does not 
privilege a majority-favored viewpoint, it nevertheless has a speech market 
impact.66 Specifically, by taking majority resources to fund minority speech the 
60. See, e.g., Cusac, supra note l , at 31 (without student activity fee funding "much student 
expression will end"); Newbart, supra note 24, at 17 (noting that the hardest hit student groups will 
be the smallest and most controversial). 
61. See, e.g., Rounds v. Oregon State Bd. of Educ., 166 F.3d 1032, 1039 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(noting that the university's goals and "underlying policies of the First Amendment" are 
"inextricably connected"); Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 1124, 1129 (7th Cir. l998XWood. J., 
· dissenting from denial ofrehearing en bane) ("[G)rafting dissenters' rights onto a neutral forum for 
the expression of a full panoply of viewpoints will most likely eliminate the forum altogether, which 
is a perverse way indeed to safeguard the kind of free and open political and intellectual debate that 
lies at the heart oftheFirstAmendment."), rev'd, No. 98-1189, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2196 ( Mar. 22, 
2000) 
62. See Kania, 702 F.2d at 480. While "[t]he mandatory fees in Abood . .. enhanced the 
power of pne, and only one, ideological group to further its political goalsL the student newspaper] 
increases the overall exchange of information, ideas, and opinions on the campus." Id 
63. Rosenberger v. Rector & Regents of the Univ. of Va, 515 U.S. 819, 835 (1995) 
(University may "ration or allocate [the] scarce resources on some acceptable neutral principle"). 
64. See id. at 834 ("University may not discriminate based on the viewpoint of private 
p~ns whose speech it facilitates .''). 
65. See id at 834 (University's purpose is to "expend0 funds to encourage a diversity of 
views from private speakers"). 
66. See Southworth, I 5 I F.3d at729 ("[T)he Regents attempt to justify forcing the objecting 
students to fund these organizations because without funding less spccch·wm result, and less 
controversial speech."). 
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government purposefully adjusts the mix of voices in the marketplace of ideas, 
augmenting the volume of minority speakers to enhance the diversity available 
for public consumption. 
This explicit government purpose to manipulate the marketplace of ideas 
means that the student activity fees cases posed a fundamentally different 
constitutional question than the earlier compel led payment cases involving union 
or bar dues.67 In the case of activity fees, dissenting students claimed a 
constitutional right to thwart a common purpose that the majority government 
claims serves free speech clause values.68 Most basically, their claim was that 
the free speech clause forbids the government to reallocate speech resources 
among private parties. 69 Consequently, at issue in the student activity fees 
controversy was a collective majority's power to compel its members to support 
the common purpose of adjusting the relative weights of the voices in the 
marketplace of ideas to promote more full dialogue and debate. 70 
B. Campaign Finance Regulations 
Campaign finance regulations are efforts by government to control the 
influence of money on politics. While there is no doubt that contributions and 
expenditures by persons and entities to and on behalf of candidates for office is 
an important and valuable part of the political process, 11 campaign finance 
regulations represent governmental determinations that large monetary transfers 
of either type undermine the integrity ·of the political process. 72 The current 
67. See Leslie Gi.elow Jacobs, Pledges, Parades, and Mandatory Payments: Creating 
Coherency in Compelled Expression, S2 RuroERS L. RBv. 123 (1999) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court's compelled expression cases are best explained as applying strict judicial scrutiny where the 
government's purpose is to manipulate the mar.ketplace of ideas). 
68. Southworth, 1 SI F.3d at 730 ("(The Regents] point to the educational benefits flowing 
from the very speech to which the plaintiffs so strenuously object."). 
69. See id. at 731 (holding that these students cannot.be required to "fund what they don't 
believe"). , 
70. See id. at 729 n.10 ("The Regents ... argue that .. . all students benefit from 'robust 
debate"' ) (citation omitted). 
71. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. l (1976). "Discussion of public issues and debate on 
the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established 
by our Constitution." Id. at 14. "(C]ontribution and expenditure limitations impose direct quantity 
restrictions on political communication and association." Id at 18. 
72. See Kenneth A. Gross, The Enforcement of Campaign Finance Rules: A System in 
Search of Reform, 9 YALE L. & POL •y RBv. 279, 280 (199 l) (noting that Congress has historically 
passed campaign finance refonns in response to scandals, including the Tillman Act, Pub. L. No. 
59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (1907)( codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441 b (1988)), passed to prevent large 
corporate contributions like those to presidential candidates William McKinley and Theodore 
Roosevelt; the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of I 925, ch. 368, 43 Stat. I 070 ( codified in scattered 
sections of 2 and 18 U.S.C.), passed in response to the Teapot Dome Scandal; and the 1974 
Amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1272 
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constitutional controversy centers around the scope of the government's authority 
to regulate campaign financing according to its determination of the public 
interest. 73 
The blueprint for the scope of the government's authority to regulate 
campaign financing comes from the Court's review of Congress's effort to 
regulate federal campaigns after the Watergate scandals.74 The Federal Election 
Campaign Act (''FECA"), 75 as amended, limited individual contributions to 
candidates,76 limited expenditures both by candidatesn and by individuals that 
related to a particular candidate,78 and imposed reporting requirements. 79 In 
Buckley v. Valeo,8° the Court generally upheld the contribution limits81 and 
reporting12 requirements but invalidated the expenditure limits as in conflict with 
the free speech and associ~tion guarantees.13 The Court found that contribution 
limits impose "only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage 
in free communication" 84 and that 'FECA's primary purpose-"to limit the 
actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial 
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431-455 (1988)) adopted after the abuses of the 1972 
presidential election). Congressional efforts to respond to scandals continue. ·see Jeremy Paul, 
Campaign Reform/or the 21st Century: Putting Mouth Where the Money ls, 30 CONN. L. REV. 
779, 780 n.2 (1998) (surveying congressional reform proposals in light of alleged 1996 campaign 
fmance abuses). 
73. See infra notes 80-90 and accompanying text. 
74. SeeROBERTE.MUTCH,CAMPAIONS,CONORESSANDCOURTS:THEMAKINoOFFEDERAL 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 47-49 (1988) (describing that public demands for campaign finance 
reform compelled legislators to act}. 
75. Congress first passed the PECA in 1971. Federal El_ection Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. 
L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1971). The amendments were the subject of Supreme Court review. 
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) 
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1998)). 
· 76. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 608(b}(I), (3) (1994} (individuals may not contribute more than 
$25,000 in a single year or more than $1000 to any single candidate for an election campaign}. 
77. See id. § 608(a), (c} (limiting candidates' use of personal and family resources in their 
campaign and capping the overall amount candidates can spend campaigning for federal office). 
78. See id. § 608(e) (individuals may not spend more than $1000 per year·"relative to a 
clearly identified candidate"}. 
79. See 2 U.S.C. § 431-456 (1994 & Supp. 1999). 
80. 424 U.S. I (1976}. 
81. See id. at 59. 1'The contribution ceilings O serve the basic governmental interest in 
safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process without directly impinging upon the rights of 
individual citizens and candidates to engage in political debate and discussion." Id. 
82. See id at 85 ("(W]e find no constitutional infirmities in the recordkeeping, reporting and 
disclosure provisions of the Act."}. 
83. See id at 59 ("[The expenditure limits] place substantial and direct restrictions on the 
ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in protected political expression, 
restrictions that the First Amendment cannot tolerate."). 
84. Id. at 20. 
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contributions"-was sufficientto justify the Act's $1000 per person contribution 
limit.15 By contrast, the Act's expenditure limits "impose direct and substantial 
restraints on the quantity of political speech."16 The Court found the 
governmental interest in preventing corruption or its appearance inadequate to 
justify the expenditure Jimits.87 The Court held that the governmental interests 
in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption are inadequate to 
justify the ceiling on independent expenditures because (I) donors can easily 
evade the Act's limit on expenditures clearly identified with a candidate; and (2) 
independent advocacy does not pose the same danger of corruption as 
contributions. 88 However, the Court also stated that the governmental interest in 
preventing corruption "does not support the limitation on the candidate's 
expenditure of his own personal funds."19 Additionally, the preventing 
corruption interest is not sufficient to justify overall campaign expenditure caps. 
The Court also found the alternative government interest "in equalizing the 
relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections" 
by "restrict[ing] the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance 
the relative voice of others" to be "wholly foreign to the First Amendment." 90 
Despite the Buckley Court's articulation of the constitutional values attached 
to campaign-related spending and giving, public perception of the damage to the 
democratic process caused by money in politics has grown since that decision.91 
Public pressure has resulted in governmental efforts, by Congress,92 state 
legislatures, 93 and voter initiatives,94 to craft refonns that will survive Buckley 's 
guidelines. Inevitably, these reform efforts end up bogged down for years in 
litigation. 95 
. . . . .. ~· ~ . .: . .. -~ .. . 
85. Id. at 26. 
86. Id. at 39. 
87. See id. at 45. 
88. See id. at 54. 
89. Id. at 56. 
90. Id. at 46-47 (independent expenditures); see id. at 52, 57-58 (rejecting this interest in 
the contexts of candidate expenditures and overall campaign spending caps). 
91. See, e.g., Paul, supra note 72, at 779 (citing news articles and surveys reflecting public 
attitudes after the 1996 federal elections. "[V]inually everyone agrees there arc problems with the 
way American elections are conducted."). 
92. See, e.g., Molly Peterson, Reexamining Compelling State Interests and Radical State 
Campaign Finance Reforms: So Goes the Nation?, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 421, 426 (1998) 
("In the first session of the 105th Congress, at least one hundred pending House and Senate bills 
proposed changes to existing federal campaign finance Jaws . .. ,"). 
93. See, e.g., William J. Connolly, How Low Can You Go? State Campaign Contribution 
Limits and the First Amendment, 16 B.U. L. REY. 483, 497-98 (1996) (noting that "[b]y the end of 
1993, all but eighteen states had imposed some fonn of contribution caps applicable to state 
election campaigns" and that "[m]ost of these limits came about through state legislation."). 
94. See id. at 498 (listing examples of state contribution limits that were products of voter 
initiatives). 
95. See Kristen Byrnes, A Survey of Federal Cases Which Involve Campaign Financing, 7 
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Because of Buckley's seemingly blanket condemnation of expenditure 
limits,96 these reforms have primarily embodied contribution Iimits.97 The focus 
of courts evaluating them has been Buckley 's requirement that the government 
demonstrate a "sufficiently important interest" to justify the limit and that the 
limit be "closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational 
freedoms ."98 Evaluation of the government interest has focused on preventing 
corruption or its appearance, 99 which in tum requires defining corruption 100 and 
evaluating evidence of its existence 101 and public perceptions about it. 102 In the 
tailoring inquiry, courts have looked to the amount of the limit, 103 often relying 
on Buckley 's other requirement that limits not be so low as to prevent candidates 
B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 333 (1998) (noting litigation status of state campaign finance regulations). 
96. See Harold Leventhal, Courts and Po/iJical Thickets, 11 COLUM. L. REY. 345,358,373 
(1977) (noting absolute language of Buckley's expenditure limit condemnation). 
97. A wide range of other types of reforms have been proposed. See CENTER FOR 
REsPONSIVEPoLmCS,MONEYINPoLrncsREFoRM: PRINCIPLES,PROBLEMSANDPROPOSALS 1, 11-
17 (1996) (listing possibilities). Some states have experimented with "voluntary'1 expenditure 
limits coupled with increased contribution limits for those candidates who agree to the expenditure 
limits. See, e.g., California Prolife Council Political Action Comm. v. Scully, 989 F. Supp. 1282, 
1287 (E.D. Cal. 1998) (noting that California's Proposition 208 contains such a provision}, ajf'd, 
164 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 1999). 
98. Russell v. Burris, 978 F. Supp. 1211, 1218 (E.D. Arlc. 1997)(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)). See, e.g., Arkansas Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Butler, 
983 F. Supp . .1209, 1220 (W.D. Ark. 1997) (noting need to determine whether the contribution 
linut at issue "burdens the exercise of political speech and, if it does, whether it is narrowly tailored 
to serve a compelling state interest" (quoting Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Maupin, 71 F.3d 1422, 
1424 (8th Cir. 1995), rev 'd. 120 S. Ct. 987 (2000))); California Prolife, 989 F. Supp. al 1293 
(citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 2S). 
99. See California Prolife, 989 F. Supp. at 1293 (finding that deterring corruption in 
government was a legitimate government interest, but that low contribution limits t~at would apply 
to candidates who did not accept voluntary expenditure limits were not closely drawn to serve the 
interest). 
I 00. See, e.g., Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finafla! Law, 14 
CONST. CoMM. 127 (1997) (noting difficulties in defining corruption); Ronald A Cass, Money, 
Power, and Politics: ·Governance Models and Campaign Finance Regulation, 6 SUP. CT. EcoN. 
REY. I, 31 (1998) ("References to corruption elicit strong visceral reactions, but corruption is not 
so easily defined as those reactions might suggest."); Frank J. Sorauf, Caught in a Political Thicket: 
The Supreme Court and Campaign Finance, 3 CONST. COMM. 97, 103 (1986) (corruption's 
"apparent clarity is deceptive, and its origin is at best clouded"}. 
IO 1.. See, e.g., California Prolife, 989 F. Supp. at 1294 (noting that the government must have 
a substantial reason to suspect corruption to justify campaign finance regulation and that conviction 
of some members of California legislature for bribery supported the government's interest). 
102. See id. at 1286-87 (noting that fact that Californians voted for Proposition 208, which 
was the subject of the litigation, indicated that they suspected corruption). 
103. This is not, however, "a constitutional minimum below which legislatures cannot 
regulate." Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897, 909 (2000). 
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from mounting a successful campaign. 10" 
The upshot of Buclcley has been to severely cripple governments' efforts to 
rem~dy what they perceive to be the damaging influence of money on the 
political ·process. That governments cannot enact expenditure limits creates 
gaping loopholes that critically undermine the effectiveness of contribution limits 
and other types of campaign finance regulations. •os Moreover, even these other 
types of restrictions remain vulnerable to reviewing courts' determinations, 
pursuant to Buckley, that the First Amendment protects individuals from such 
government regulation . 106 
The constitutional dilemma in the context of campaign financing is thus the 
correctness of Buckley 's balance between the individual's free speech right and 
the collective majority's power to regulate the speech market according to its 
vision of the public good and free speech clause values. 107 The current focus of 
campaign finance reforms and litigation stems from the Court's early rejection 
of a valid government interest in equalizing the volume of the voices that 
participate in political campaigns. u>1i Although the means of restriction did not 
exhibit government favoritism of particular points of view, crucial to the Court 
was that the government's purpose was nevertheless speech market-related. 109 
Specifically, the government's purpose was to adjust the mix of voices in the 
speech market, restricting the volume of majority speakers to enhance the 
diversity of ideas available for public consumption. 110 By finding such a purpose 
.. · ~ ... ·. :.<,•, .:'·· : , : ' 
~· ;: . .. .. 
··-
.,,, . .. " . . 
104. See id. (rather than a specific dollar amount, the test is whether "the constitution 
limitation [is] so radical in effect as to render political association ineffective, drive the sound of 
a candidate's voice below notice, and render contributions pointless"). 
105. See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 
U.S . 480,511 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) ("As in Buckley, I am convinced that it Is pointless to 
limit the amount that can be contributed to a candidate or spent with his approval without also 
limiting the amounts ·that can be spent on his behalf.") (footnote omitted). "[Independent 
expenditure] controls are imperative if Congress is to enact meaningful limits on direct 
contributions ." Id. at n.9 (citing S. REP. No. 93-689, at 18-_19 (1974) reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5604-5605) 
106. See, e.g., California Prolife, 989 F. Supp. at 1293 (inv11lidating contribution limits as 
not sufficiently related to interest in deterring corruption). 
I 07. See Edward B. Foley, Philosophy, the Constitution, and Campaign Finance , 10 STAN. 
L. & POL' YREV. 23, 23 (1998) (arguing that "the United States Constitution should be construed 
to permit Congress to choose [among visions of campaign finance reform]."). 
108. See Bucldey v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976). 
109. See id. at 18. 
Although the Act does not focus on the ideas expressed by persons or groups subject to 
its regulations, ... it is beyond dispute that the interest in regulating the alleged 
"conduct" of giving or spending money "arises in some measure because the 
communication allegedly integral to the conduct is itself thought to be harmful." 
Id. (citing United States v. O'Brien , 391 U.S. 376,382 (1968)). 
110. In the campaign finance context, the speech market adjustment purpose is closely related 
to a purpose to adjust "the relative ability of all voters to affect electoral outcomes." Id. at 17. 
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.antithetical to the First Amendment, the Court articulated a constitutional vision 
in which an individual's interest in unlimited campaign spending trumps the 
collective majority's interest in restricting itto serve a public interest in ensuring 
full and robust political dialogue and debate. 111 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LINK 
The link between the student activity fee and campaign finance issues is that 
both require defining the scope of the individual free speech right against the 
scope of the government's discret iion to create and structure a forum for 
expression by a broad range of speakers. Determining the meaning of the free 
speech clause in any particular <;ontext requires assessing the nature and weight 
of the individual's free speech interests , the interests served by the government 
action and the free speech impact of the government's means of achieving its 
objective. 112 All of these elements are substantially the same in the contexts of 
mandatory student activity fees that fund expression and campaign finance 
regulations. 
A. The Individual Free Speech Right: Money = Speech 
The crucial premise that defines the individual free speech right in both the 
student activity fees and campaign finance contexts is that money is speech. 113 
So, compelling an individual to fund speech is the same as compelling the 
11 l. See id. at 48. "Advocacy of the election or defeat of candidates for federal office is no 
less entitled to protection under the First Amendment than the discussion of political policy 
generally or advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation." Id. Additionally, the Court held that 
"the First Amendment simply cannot tolerate [the Act's) restriction upon the freedom ofa candidate 
to speak without legislative limit on behalf of his own candidacy." Id. at 54. 
112. All of the various tests used to determine free speech issues require consideration of 
these factors. See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm., 512 
U.S. 622, 662 ( 1994) ("The intermediate level of scrutiny [requires that a) regulation promoteO a 
substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation." 
(quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989))); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. 
Members of the N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 ( 1991) (under strict scrutiny, 
Court looks to where the government action «is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and 
is narrowly drawn to achieve that end"); United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985); 
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (regulation of ex.pressive conduct will be upheld if "it 'furthers an 
important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment 
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."). 
113. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Regents of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,830 (1995) 
(student act.ivity fund is a speech forum "more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic 
sense, but the same principles are applicable"); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19 (''A restriction on the 
amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign 
necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the 
depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached,'.'). 
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individual to speak 114 and restricting an individual's expenditures toward 
speech 115 is the same as restricting the individual's speech directly .116 
Of course, money is not really speech. 117 And, compelling or restricting the 
payment of money that is used for speech 118 is not exactly the same as compelling 
or restricting speech directly .119 Rather , the money = speech equation made by 
the Court in both contexts constitutes a judgment that the government actions 
regarding money are enough like government actions aimed at speech that they 
should be subject to the same constitutional scrutiny. 120 
A number of variables can make types of cases "the same" for purposes of 
free speech claus~ analysis. . Language in the decisions implying that the 
individual autonomy impact of compelled 121 or restricted 122 expenditures make~ 
. :,"'. ~ 
,.: .·:_ :' •• < ,~. 
114.' See Abood° v. Detrot Bd . ofEduc., 431 U.~ . 209, 235-36 (l 977)(equating compelled 
funding of speech with compelled recitation of the pledge of allegiance (citing West Virginia Bd. 
ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,642 ( 1943))). 
l 15. In the context of campaign finance regulations, the Court has distinguished expenditure 
restrictio ns from contribution restrictions . The former constitute '$direct restraints on speech," while 
the latter "[bear ] more heavily on the association or right than on freedom ~o speak." Nixon v. 
Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct 897, 899 (2000) (citing Buc/c/ey, 424 U.S. at 19, 24-25). 
116. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 234 (" [C)ontributing to an organization for the purpose of 
spreading a political message ... ' impHcate[s] fundamental First Amendment interests."' (quoting 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23)); Buc/c/ey, 424 U.S. at 16 ("The expenditure of money simply cannot be 
equated with O conduct.' '). 
117. See Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, 
470 U.S. 480 , 493 (1985) where the Court held that "the expenditures at issue in this case produce 
speech at the core of the First Amendment." Additionally , as one dissenter noted, " (Expenditures] 
produce such speech: they arc not speech itself." id. at 509 (White, J., dissenting) . See also 
Shrink, 120 S. Ct at 910 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Money is property ; it is not speech. ") . 
118. Not every dollar of every contribution or expenditure is used for speech . See Buckley, 
424 U.S. at 263 (White, J ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("There are O many expensive 
campaign activities that arc not themselves communicative or remotely related to speech .") . 
1 l 9. See Federal Election Comm 'n, 470 U.S . at 508-09 (White, l , dissenting) ("The burden 
on actual speech imposed by limitations on the spending of money is minimal and indirect All 
rights of direct political expression and advocacy arc rctai~ed."). 
120. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15-20 (rejecting treating restrictions on money like restrictions 
on conduc t, and deciding to treat them as "restraints on First Amendment liberty that arc both gross 
and direct") . But see J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: ls Money Speech?, 85 YALE 
L.J. 1001, 1005 (1976)( " [N]othing in the First Amendment commits us to the dogma that money 
is speech."). 
121. See Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 730 (7th Cir . 1998) (compulsory student 
activity fees funding conflicts with students' "deeply held religious and personal beliefs" and the 
Constitution guarantees "that 'we the people' will not be compelled to pay for such speech: '[f]o 
compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he 
disbelieves, is sinful and tyranni cal."' (quoting Abood, 431 U.S . at 234-35 n.31) , rev 'd, No . 98· 
1189, 2000 U.S . LEXI S 2196 (Mar . 22, 2000)) . 
122. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49 (independent expenditure ceiling "heavily burdens ... the 
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these actions constitutionally the same as government actions compelling or 
restricting speech directly is misleading. The individual autonomy impact of 
governmental control of an individual's money as opposed to her speech is in fact 
quite different. 
The compelled funding cases derive from cases where the government 
compelled speech directly. 123 Where the government compels individuals to 
speak or otherwise express words not of their own choosing, an autonomy 
violation can occur either because the forced speech indoctrinates the speaker or 
because it publicly associates the speaker with the unwanted message. 124 Neither 
of these autonomy harms oc~ur "".ith compelled funding. 12s United States citizens 
must fund speech all the time through taxes. 126 These people are not compelled 
to utter messages out of their own mouths , to become couriers for the government 
message , or otherwise to be publicly associated with the message. 127 They are 
simply required to participate, along with a number of other individuals, in 
funding speech that a reasonable observer knows does not represent the point of 
view of every_ individual who contributed to its propagation. 128 Although 
individual taxpayers may violently disagree with the messages of the 
First Amendment right to 'speak one's mind ... on all. public institutions"' (quoting New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 2S4, 269 (1964))). 
123. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 23S (quoting West Virginia Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624,642 (1943) (invalidating compelled flag salute and pledge)). 
124. See Jacobs, supra note 67. 
125. See id.; Cantor, supra note 54. 
A first amendment violation would not seem to arise without government prescription 
of a message or forced identification with, or affirmation of, a message by the payor. 
The genre of spiritual invasion entailed in the payment of service fees for ideologically 
distasteful ends is quite different fonn the invasion condemned in BarruJtte or Wooley. 
Id. at 19. 
126. See Southworth, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2196, at •21 ("The government, as a general rule, 
may support valid programs and policies by taxes or other exactions binding on parties."); Keller 
v. State Bar of CeJ., 496 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1990) ("If every citizen were to have a right to insist that 
no one paid by public funds express a view with which he disagreed, debate over issues of great 
concern to the public would be limited to those in the private sector, and the process of government 
as we know it radically transformed."); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982) ("The tax 
system could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax 
payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief."). 
127. Cf Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, S21 U.S. 457, 470-71 (1997) (using these 
grounds to distinguish forced contributions for advertising from u.nconstitutional compelled 
expression). 
128. See Cantor, supra note S4, at 25 ("[S]uch incursions upon conscience through forced 
'support' of distasteful causes is an inevitable concomitant ofliving in an organized society."). Cf 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., SIS U.S. 819, 843-44 (1995) (government 
transfer of money used for religious speech docs not violate Establishment Clause where method 
of distributing money to private groups is "religion-neutral"). 
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govemment129 or private individuals or entities that the government funds with 
taxes, 130 this individual impact is not enough to constitute a free speech clause 
violation.131 
Similarly, restrictions on spending money to produce speech do not impact 
individuals' autonomy interests as severely as direct speech restrictions .. A 
speaker who cannot spend money can still speak, 132 although his means and 
probably the size of his audience are limited.133 But a speaker who cannot speak 
cannot do it at all. The Court in fact routinely upholds government actions that 
restrict the money that is available for speech activities134 or restrict types of 
activities on which individuals might want to spend their money to communicate 
a message. m Taxes both compel people to fund expression with which they 
disagree and take away financial resources that could be used to communicate the 
taxpayer's chosen message.136 Time, place and manner rules may 
constitutionall6 restrict the way that individuals can spend their money to communicate. 37 People who can employ solicitors to ring doorbells still might 
,~ 
129. Tax protesters must pay taxes despite disagreement with government policies or speech. 
Se.e Southworth, 2000 U.S. LEXlS 2196, at •21. 
130. See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (government funds 
disbursed to artists); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834 ("When the government disburses public funds 
to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps 
to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee."). 
131. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 ("[W]hen the government appropriates public funds 
to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes."). 
132. See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 
U.S. 480, 509 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) ("The burden on actual speech imposed by limitations 
on the spending of money is minimal and indirect All rights of direct political expression and 
advocacy are retained."). 
133. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) ("A restriction on the amount of money a 
person or group can spend on political commuoication during a campaign necessarily reduces the 
quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, 
and the size of the audience reached:"). But see Wright, supra note 120, at 1012 ("The giving and 
spending restrictions may cause candidates and other individuals to rely more on less expensive 
means of communication. But there is no reason to believe that such a shift in means reduces the 
number of issues discussed in a campaign."). . 
134. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 263-64 (White, J., dissenting) (listing numerous ways the 
government takes money from media or makes their operations more expensive, thus reducing the 
money available for speech). 
135. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949)(upholding loudspeaker ban); Ward v. 
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (upholding requirement that groups use city-provided 
sound systems and technicians for concerts in the Bandshell in Central Park). 
136. See Cantor, supra note 54, at 28 ("[Under this] rationale, a first amendment attack on 
diminution of expressive capacity could be applicable to every government fiscal extraction- i.e., 
tax, fee, toll, or rent."). 
137. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 ("Even in a public forum the government may impose 
reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech."). 
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not be allowed to do so.131 Having the money to construct huge neon signboards 
for a yard display does not mean that it is permitted, 139 and volume controls limit 
those with the resources to amplify their messages. 140 
All of the above ex~ples confirm that when the Court equates money with 
speech something other than the impact of the government action on the 
complaining individual's ability to speak freely is its reason. While speech is 
always speech, whether money is speech for First Amendment purposes depends 
upon the context. What is significant about the context is not the degree of 
impingement on the individual's personal liberty. Rather, what explains the 
money as speech correlation in both the student fee and campaign finance 
contexts is the speech market effect of the government action. Specifically, in 
both instances the government's regulation of money "skews" 141 the mix of 
nongovernment voices in the marketplace of ideas. 142 That the speech market 
alteration effect is what brings the First Amendment into play is a crucial link 
between the cases because it signals that the constitutional analysis must focus 
on the nature of and justification for the marketplace of ideas effect rather than 
on an abstract assessment of the degree ofindividual autonomy impingement that 
occurs when the government regulates money. 
B. Government Purpose : To Create and Structure a Speech Forum 
The government actions of compelling the payment of student activity fees 
and restricting campaign-related contributions and expenditures have an effect 
on the speech market, but, in both contexts, this impact is purposeful rather than 
incidental. 143 This government purpose is another crucial link between the cases. 
Stated most broadly, the government's purpose in both types of cases is to create 
138. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943) (invalidating blanket no 
soliciting rule but stating that a rule that enforced a homeowner's decision not to receive solicitors 
would be valid) . 
139. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58 (1994)(invalidating city's blanket ban on 
residential signs but stating that "more temperate measures" could comply with the Constitution) . 
140. See Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 77. 
141. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., SIS U.S. 819,895 (!995) (Souter, 
]., dissenting) (there should be no constitutional problem with student activity fee funding because 
it "do[es] not skew debate by funding one position but not its competitors"); R.A .V. v. City of St. 
Paul, SOS U.S. 377,430 (1992) (finding that a regulation that evidences viewpoint discrimination 
"requires particular scrutiny, in part because such regulation often indicates a legislative effort to 
skew public debate on an issue"). 
142. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I , 49-SO ( 1976) (condemning government effort to 
equalize relative abilities of individuals and groups to participate in political debate). 
143. See Rosenberger, SIS U.S. at 841 ("The object of the [student activity fund] is to open 
a forum for speech and to support various student enterprises, including the publication of 
newspapers, in recognition of the diversity and creativity of studen_t life."); Buckley , 424 U.S. at 49 
(one "government interest" is to "eq ualiz[e] the relative ability of individuals and groups to 
influence the outcome of elections"). 
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a speech forum that has a different composition of voices than would exist in the 
private speech market without government intervention. 144 
Purposeful government action that affects the private speech market is highly 
suspect. 143 Nevertheless, sometimes even purposefully speech-conscious 
government action can comport with the free speech guarantee. Specifically , 
where the government creates and structures a public forum , its ~ech-conscious 
action may serve rather than thwart free speech clause values. 14 Where creating 
a public forum is the government purpose, the inquiry in any particular case must 
be the strength of the government's interest in creating the forum and the 
safeguards available to prevent the ostensibly speech-enhancing government 
action from having speech-restrictive results. 
As in other instances where the government's purpose is to create and 
structure a public forum, in both the student fee and campaign · finance contexts 
inherent in the government's purpose is the goal of promoting free speech clause 
values. 147 While pursuing this purpose involves controversial theoretical 141 and 
factual 149 determinations, this goal of affirmatively serving constitutional values 
distinguishes these contexts from instances where the government pursues 
speech-conscious action for purposes inimical to free speech clause values. 
C. The Means: Compelled vs. Restricted Spending 
One difference between student fee funding mechanisms and campaign 
.... . 
· 1'44.' See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49 (purpose is to "equalize'' expression as compared to private 
distribution)_; Southworth v. Grebe, No. 98-1189, 2000 U.S. LEXlS 2196, at •26 (Mar. 22, 2000} 
(university's purpose is "to facilitate a wide range of speech''}, rev 'g 151 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1998). 
145. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 792 (1989} ("The government's 
purpose is the controlling consideration [in determining whether a regulation is content neutral}."}. 
146. See Rosenberger, S 15 U.S. at 829-30 (assuming that in many instances the government 
may decide to create a limited public forum and discussing the rules that apply}; Baker, supra note 
3, at 16·24 (1998) (discussing numerous instancesof"institutionally bound" speech, such as within 
government decision making bodies). . 
147. See, e.g., Rounds v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 166 F.3d 1032, 1039 (9th Cir. 
1999) (university's goals arc "inextricably connected with the underlying policies of the First 
Amendment'); Burt Ncubornc, Buckley's Analytical Flaws, J.L. & POL' Y 111, 121 (1997) (goal 
of campaign financing regulation is "to search for a system of structural rules that will enable a 
more reasoned, a more open, and a more equal discussion leading up to the crucial vote"}. 
148. See Foley, supra note 107, at 23 (noting that "[t}wo starldy different visions dominate 
contemporary debates about campaign finance reform" and that "[the} stark difference between the 
egalitarian and libertarian position on campaign finance derives from a deep-rooted philosophical 
disagreement about economic justice."}. Compare Southworth, 151 F.3d at 730 ("educational 
benefits" of fee forum do not justify compelling students to fund "speech to which [they] 
strenuously object"}, with Rounds, 166 F.3d at 1040 n.S (''To the extent that Southworth holds that 
a public university may not constitutionally establish and fund a limited public forum for the 
expression of diverse viewpoints, we respectfully disagree."). 
149. See Cass, supra note 100, at 1 (questioning premises of campaign finance refonn). 
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finance regulations is the means used by the government to achieve its objectives. 
With respect to activity fees, students object to being forc.ed to pay for speech, 
whereas with respect to campaign finance regulations, candidates and their 
supporters object to not being allowed to do so. In these cases, however, the 
difference in means does not affect the central constitutional issue. . 
As noted above, 1'° the central constitutional issue is whether the government 
may create a public forum for the purpose of diversifying the voices that would 
be available absent government intervention. This involves assessing the 
constitutional interests on either side of the controversies. One of these is the 
individual's interest in speaking without government regulation.151 .Where the 
government acts toward speech-directly, free speech doctrine generally does not 
distinguish between the means of compulsion and restriction. 152 Where the 
government acts toward an individual's money, there is even less reason to do so. 
Whether the government compels spending toward speech activities or restricts 
them, the individual can still speak freely. 
Despite this fundamental similarity, when money is equated with speech, the 
government means of compelling as opposed to restricting spending for speech 
produce somewhat different individual and speech market effects. These effects, 
however, are balanced so that neither the means of compelling or restricting 
contributions for speech is clearly the better way to preserve free speech clause 
values. 
On first consideration, the individual impact of compelling fees to fund a 
public forum may appear less severe than restricting speech expenditures. 
Although fee compulsions indirectly restrict individual spending on speech by 
reducing the overall amount of money that the individual has to engage in speech 
activities, after making the required contributions, individuals remain free to 
spend any amount of their remaining funds on expression. By contrast, 
restricting individual spending for speech limits the individual's speech spending 
for the designated type of speech absolutely. 
Another perspective, however, highlights the individual impact of 
contribution compulsions. Where individuals pay a fee to support a public 
ISO. See supra Part 111.B. 
I SI. See supra Part Ill.A. (discussing individual autonomy interest and the money/speech 
correlation). 
152. See. e.g., Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796-97 
( 1988) ("There is certainly some difference between compelled speech and compelled silence, but 
in the context of protected speech, the difference is without constitutional significance, for the First 
Amendment guarantees 'freedom of speech,' a term necessarily comprising the decision of both 
what to say and what not to say."). But see 2.auderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 
626, 651 ( l 985) ("[l]n virtually all our commercial speech decisions to date, we have emphasized 
that because disclosure requirements trench much more narrowly on an advertiser's interests than 
do flat prohibitions on speech, 'waming[s] or disclaimer[s] might be appropriately required ... in 
order to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or decepti,on."' (quoting/n re R.M.J., 455 
U.S. 191, 201 (1982))). 
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forum, they create speech that would not otherwise have existed. m The 
contributors thereby indirectly bring into being speech with which they may 
strongly disagree. Where the government restricts expenditures for speech, no 
one pays to bring potentially offensive speech into being. Opposing viewpoints 
can speak only according to the weight of the resources that they can gamer in 
the private speech market. 154 In this way, expenditure restrictions might appear 
to be less intrusive on individual speech interests. 
Similarly, the speech market effects of contribution compulsions, as opposed 
to expenditure restrictions, are mixed so that there is no means to create a speech 
forum that is always constitutionally preferable. Although f,ee compulsions do 
not directly restrict contributions for speech, they indirectly do so by reducing 
contributors' total resources. 155 So, while fees create speech they may also 
reduce it. u6 And, while expenditure restrictions undoubtedly reduce the quantity 
of speech by .those subject to the restrictions, they may, in fact, increase speech 
by others who perceived expression in an unregulated market to be pointless. 
Moreover, the effect of the government's chosen means on the absolute volume 
of speech in the marketplace is not the only way to determine whether the 
government action serves free speech clause values. If the government can show 
a legitimate interest in regulating the relative weight of voices to promote 
diversity or fair deliberation, then the crucial inquiry moves from the absolute 
volume of speech preserved by the means of compulsion as opposed to restriction 
to their comparative merits in achieving one of these alternate objectives. 
For all of these reasons, the means of fee compulsion as opposed to 
expenditure restriction do not crucially distinguish the student activity fee and 
campaign finance issues. The central question in both involves the government's 
discretion to choose to create and structure a public forum. Its means, of course , 
will be relevant, but must be assessed in light of the other factors in the 
constitutional analysis , specifically the strength of the government purpose and 
the effects of the government action in the particular context. 
· 153. See Owen M. Fiss, State Activism and State Censorship , 100 YALEL.J. 2087, 2096 
( 1991) (subsidies "have a productive value: they bring into existence [expression] that would not 
have existed but for the subsidies."). 
I 54. See Cusac, supra note 1, at 30 (quoting Alliance Defense Fund's president as proposing 
that, instead of distributing student fees to I~ popular student groups, "the university could teach 
student groups how to market themselves."). 
155. See Cantor, supra note 54, at 27 (noting that "a connection between dollars collected 
from an individual and expressive activity .. . raises the claim that compelled financial extractions 
deplete the economic resources of the payor and thereby diminish his expressive capacity."). 
156. See id. at 28 (noting that while the claim of diminished capacity to speak because offce 
exactions may be true absolutely, as a constitutional claim it "extend(s] too far" because "a first 
amendment attack on diminution of expressive capacity could be applicable to every government 
fiscal extraction-Le. , tax, fee, toll, or rent."). 
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Ill. DETERMINING THE CONSTTTUTIONALL Y PERMISSIBLE 
SCOPE OF GOVERNMENT ACTION 
459 
Determining the constitutionally permissible scope of government action in 
both the student activity fees and campaign finance cases requires determining 
the government interests that can justify purposeful speech market adjustment, 
as well as effects that can defeat the constitutionality of the action. 
A. Interests That Can Justify Speech Market Adjustm~nt 
1. Encouraging Diverse Speech.-In numerous contexts, the government 
may choose to encourage diverse expression, even though this purpose 
necessarily changes the mix of voices in the private speech market from what it 
would have been absent government intervention. One of these contexts is ~here 
the government allocates a scarce resource. The government can allocate radio 
waves"' and regulate cable television 158 to serve the public interest in receiving 
a broad range of types of expression. Pursuing this interest, of course, results in 
a different mix of radio and television speakers than would allocation to the 
highest bidders. 
Another way that the government can encourage diverse expression is by 
creating and maintaining public forums.159 The constitutional doctrine that 
defines public forums emphasizes that the government must act "neutrally" when 
it structures the conversation within these arenas, 160 perhaps lending the 
impression that the speech that occurs in public forums merely amplifies the 
speech that occurs in the private marketplace of ideas. This emphasis on 
neutrality, however, obscures the speech adjustment inherent in creating or 
maintaining the forum in the first instance. The existence of public forums 
generally augments the speech power of minority as opposed to majority voices, 
and of poor as opposed to wealthy speakers. 161 Public forums actually represent 
157. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, J.69 
(1969) (discussing the Federal Communications Commission's "fairness doctrine" which requires 
that "discussion of public issues be presented on broadcast stations, and that each side of those 
issues must be given fair coverage."). 
158. See Turner Bro~. Sys., Inc. v. Federal Com~unications Comm'n, 520 U.S. 180, 189 
(1997) (holding that must-carry regulation imposed on cable operators serves "three interrelated 
interests: (1) preserving the benefits of free, over-the•air local broadcast television, (2) promoting 
the widespread dissemination ofinfonnation from a multiplicity of sources, and (3) promoting fair 
competition in the market for television programming"). 
159. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) 
(describing three different types of public forum: traditional, limited public, and nonpublic). 
160. See id. (regulations must be content neutral in a traditional public forum); Rosenberger, 
515U.S. at 830-31 (in a limited public forum, regulations must be viewpoint neutral, and must be 
content neutral except to the extent necessary to maintain the purposes of the forum); Perry Educ. 
Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45 (regulations in a nonpublic forum must be viewpoint neutral). 
161. Neutral rules for allocating the forums will usually diminish private power differences. 
For example, a rule that allows each student group to meet in a university classroom once a month 
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a redistribution of resources from majority to minority speakers as government 
funds pay to create and maintain the arenas. 162 
Creating and maintaining public forums represents one form of government 
subsidy of speech. The government may also make more direct money payments 
to encourage diverse private speech. Arts funding by the government brings art 
into being that would not otherwise exist, thus purposefully and necessarily 
affecting the content of the marketplace of ideas. 163 Funding of public television 
similarly creates private speech and affects the private speech market. And, 
when universities sponsor speakers series, they act with the purpose of exposing 
their students to ideas not sufficiently available or prominent in the private 
market. 164 In all of these instances, the public purpose of creating diversity in the 
marketplace of ideas justifies using public resources to pursue it. 
The government may also sometimes act through the means of restricting 
speech to achieve its goal of promoting diverse expression. Structuring and 
maintaining even the most open public forums involves restricting the speech of 
some private individuals to preserve the forum for a broad range of participants. 
Parade pennits 165 time limi~ or allocations 166 and volume controls 167 limit the 
quantity of speech that any individual can deliver, but are also consistent with 
encouraging wide open discussion and debate. Moreover, if subsidies are viewed 
as productive, giving funding to one sgeaker necessarily silences another who 
wanted to receive the scarce funding.• 
would give the five-person group the same access as the fifty-person group. See, e.g., Widmar v. 
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (university meeting facilities must be open to all student groups). 
If forced to pay for the facilities, the groups would likely not have equal access. In some instances, 
however, "neutral'' rules can reinforce or exacerbate existing power differences. A university rule 
providing classroom access only to groups with membership offifty or more would have this effect · 
by granting a subsidy only to groups with broad support. 
162. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va, SIS U.S. 819, 843-44 {1995) 
("The government usually acts by spending money. Even the provision of a meeting room [which 
constitutes a public forum) involve[s] governmental expenditure, if only in the form of electricity 
and heating or cooling costs."). 
163. See National Endowment for the Ans v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (National 
Endowment for the Arts uses federal funds to "help create and sustain" art (citing 20 U.S.C. § 
951(7)); Fiss, supra note 153, at 2096 ("[Subsidies] have a productive value: they bring into 
existence art, perfonnances, or exhibitions that would not have existed but for the subsidies."). 
164. See Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 1998)(students do not challenge 
use of the studentactivity fees to fund the Distinguished Lecture Series), rev 'd, No. 98-1189, 2000 
U.S. LEXIS 2196 (Mar. 22, 2000). 
165. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). 
166. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, SIS U.S. 753 (1995) (private 
groups can erect unattended displays for a certain number of weeks). 
167. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (I 989)(perfonners required to use city 
sound equipment in Central Park Ban.dshell). 
168. See Fiss, supra note I 53, at 2097 ("[S]ilencing is a necessary concomitant of every 
allocative decision"). 
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In all of these ways, the government can- act to diversify the expression 
available for public consumption even though inherent in the act of 
diversification is adjustment of the mix of voices in the marketplace of ideas. 
2. Promoting Fair Deliberation anfl Decisionmaking.- Another interestthat 
can justify purposefully speech-conscious government action is to promote fair 
deliberation and decision making. Judicial proceedings, legislative sessions, 169 
and administrative hearings operate according to rules that purposefully adjust 
what would be the private speaking power of the participants. 170 Strict rules 
define the quantity of speech that any individual speaker can deliver 171 and public 
monies fund the forums, thereby effectively transferring speech resources by 
government fiat. 
Like the speech adjustment to pursue the purpose of diversity, this speech 
adjustment also has the effect of privileging some speakers over others, 
particularly those without private power over those who possess it. Moreover, 
sometimes the government purpose to restrict the speech of more powerful 
speakers to prevent one message from drowning out all others can be more 
blatant when the need is more compelling. One circumstance is union elections, 
where rules limit the employer's voice to ensure that employees can receive and 
digest alternate messages. 172 
These instances demonstrate that some public interests in full or fair debate 
can justify purposeful government adjustment of voices in the marketplace of 
ideas, as well as the use of public resources to do so. They also represent broad 
acceptance of the government's discretion to choose equalizing the powers of 
various speakers as the means to ensure fairness in debate, deliberation and 
decision making . 
3. Protecting Disfavored Speakers.-The Constitution not only allows the 
government to act in ways that adjust the relative weights of private voices in the 
marketplace of ideas , sometimes it requires the govemmenno do so. One such 
instance is when unpopular speakers create a hostile audience reaction .173 Absent 
169. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov'tPAC, 120 S. Ct. 897,9 12 (2000)(Breycr, l. , concurring) 
. ("[Iln Congress •.. constitutionally protected debateO is limited to provide every member an equal 
opportunity to express his·or her views."). 
170. See Baker, supra note 3, at 21-24 ("Within institutions of democratic governance, 
acceptable regulation of speech, including content regulation, is ubiquitous."). 
171. See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Public Debate and Campaign Finance, 30 CONN. L. REV. 
817, 819 ( 1998) ("[T)he Chief Justice does not violate the Constitution when he tells advocates that 
their time is up during oral argument in the Supreme Court."). 
172. See Clyde W. Summers, Questioning the Unquestioned in Collective Labor Law, 41 
CATH. U.L. REV. 791,805 (l 998)(1isting limitations on employer speech and proposing additional 
ones). 
173. See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) (demonstrators arrested 
because their speech incited onlookers to violence); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) 
(speaker arrested because his speech was "inflammatory"); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 
229, 237 ( 1963) (speakers arrested because their speech was "suffi~iently opposed to the views of 
the majority of the community to attract a crowd and necessitate police protection"); Feinerv. New 
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government intervention, the hostile audience would likely silence the speaker. 174 
Where public disorder is imminent., arresting the speaker to prevent the violence 
would mirror the result of the private marketplace of ideas. The Constitution, 
however, forbids this. m To fulfill its responsibility of preserving public order, 
the government must use the threat of force to protect the unpopular speaker. 176 
Not only does protecting a speaker from a hostile audience change the mix 
of voices that would otherwise exist in the marketplace of ideas, it also both 
redirects resources from majority to minority speakers and restricts the speech 
of majority speakers to ensure that the minority speech can be heard. When 
unpopular speech provokes an audience to violence, the least costly option is to 
arrest the speaker. By foreclosing this option, the Constitution effectively 
mandates that the government expend majority resources to protect the minority 
speaker, even though the public resources expended to do so far exceed the 
speaker's "share" of the speech market. 177 This use of public _resources · 
subsidizes minority speech with majority dotlars. 178 
Police protection of unpopular speakers can also take the form of restricting 
majority speech that threatens to drown out the minority message. 179 So, police 
may eject hecklers from speech halls or quiet a crowd that makes it impossible 
York, 340 U.S. 315,317 (1951) ("[Police) stepped ln to prevent [speech] from resulting.in a 
fight."); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. I, 3 (1949) (speaker arrested and charged with using 
speech that "stir[redJ the public to anger, invit[ed] dispute, [brought) about a condition of unrest, 
or creat[ed) a disturbance"). 
174. See, e.g., Gregory, 394 U.S. at 111 (noting the ratio between demonstrator and onlooker 
was 85:1000). 
175. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 133 n.l (19q6) ("Participants in an orderly 
demonstration in a public place are not chargeable with the danger, unprovoked except by the fact 
of the constitutionally protected demonstration itself, that their critics might react with disorder.or 
violence."). This rule evolved over time. Compare Feiner, 340 U.S. at 320 (speaker can be 
arrested for "the reaction [his speech] a~ly engendered"), with Gregory, 394 U.S. at 111 
(speaker cannot be arrested for disorderly conduct because of listeners' reaction). 
176. See Edwards, 372 U.S. at 237 (''.The Fourteenth Amendment [of the Constitution) does 
not permit a State to make criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular views."). 
177. See Gregory, 394 U.S. at 111 (o·ne hundred police officers protect 85 protesters); 
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 136 (1992) (holding that a county cannot 
charge a higher demonstration fee to cover the cost of police protection "in the case of a 
controversial political message delivered before a hostile audience"). 
178. See Francis X. Clines, Neo--Nazis Cancel D. C. March After Only 4 Show Up, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 8, 1999, at A6 (a force of 1,426 police officers provided a security cordon 
for a neo-Nazi hate march that did not occur; police chieflaments that "the city had just spent close 
to SI million protecting the civil rights of a no-show troublemaker."). 
179. See Gregory, 394 U.S. at 111 (Constitution does not permit police to arrest about 8S 
protesters because of hostile reaction of over I 000 onlookers); see also In re Kay, I Cal. 3d 930, 
941 (1970) (en bane) ("[T]he state retains a legitimate concern in ensuring that some individuals' 
unruly assertion of their rights of free expression does not imperil other citizens' rights of free 
association and discussion."). 
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for the speaker to be heard. The silenced speakers may speak at another time, in 
another place or in another manner. Nevertheless, the government action of 
.restricting what would be their private power to dominate and drown out less 
powerful speakers alters and equalizes the balance of voices in the marketplace 
of ideas. 
Numerous free s~ech clause values underpin this requirement that the 
government act affirmatively to protect unpopular speakers. 180 In any event, its 
gist refutes a vision of the First Amendment that enshrines private ordering as the 
speech market distribution that best serves the public value of robust discussion 
and debate. Embedded in free speech clause doctrine is the different vision of 
the minority speaker or. "lonely pamphleteer" 181 as entitled to government 
protection beyond that which he would be able to acquire either through votes in 
the democratic process or dollars in the private market. That this vision compels 
the redistribution ofresourcesand sometimes the suppression of majority speech 
to protect, and thereby encourage, minority speech suggests that it also leaves 
room for government discretion to decide to do these things for this purpose. 
B. Constitutional Concerns That Can Invalidate 
Speech-Conscious Government Action 
1. The Danger of Government Favoritism.-The primary danger against 
which the free speech clause protects is governmental favoritism of certain 
viewpoints in the marketplace of ideas. 182 Whether the favoritism takes the form 
~ ... 
180. See Edward L. Rubin, Review Essay: Nazis. Skokie, and the First Amendment as Virtue, 
74 CAL. L. REV. 233 ( 1986) (discussing free speech clause values that might protect Nazi speech); 
Lee Bollinger, The Skokie Legacy: Reflections on an "Ea.vy Case" and Free Speech Theory, 80 
MICH. L. REV. 617 (1982). 
One can understand , .. [the] choice to protect the free speech activities of Nazis, but 
not because people would value their message in the slightest or believe it should be 
seriously entertained, not because a commitment to self-government or rationality 
logically demands that such ideas be presented for consideration, ... not because a line 
could not be drawn that would exclude this ideology without inevitably encroaching on 
ideas that one likes-not for any of these reasons nor others related to them that are a 
part of the traditional baggage of the free speech argumentation; but rather because the 
danger of intolerance towards ideas is so pervasive an issue in our social lives, the 
process of mastering a capacity for tolerance so difficult, that it malces sense somewhere 
in the system to attempt to confront that problem and exercise more self-restraint than 
may be otherwise required. 
Id. at 629-31. 
181. See Branzburgv. Hayes, 408U.S. 665, 704(1972)("Traditional doctrine[is] that liberty 
of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph just as 
much as of the large metropolitan publisher who utllizes the latest photocomposition methods."). 
182. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., SIS U.S. 819, 828 (1995)( "In 
the realm of private speech or expression, government regulation may not favor one speaker over 
another."). 
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of a resource transfer 113 or a speech restriction, 114 the Court looks at it with great 
suspicion. This suspicion stems from the fact that government censorship 
threatens all of the values that underlie the free speech guarantee."' 
Fundamental to these values is ensuring that there exists a wide open and robust 
marketplace of ideas so that individuals can seek to discover individual truths 116 
as well as engage in the reflective self-government on which democracy 
depends. 117 
This fear of government favoritism in the speech market leads to the 
fundamental analytical division in free speech clause doctrine between content-
based and content neutral government actions. 188 The fonner are subject to strict 
scrutiny, 189 while the latter are subject to a balancing that weighs the government 
interest against the burden on free speech interests.190 Although viewpoint 
discrimination is the most egregious form of government favoritism, 191 subject 
. . . ·, ,~ i '' !• 
183. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) 
(holding that a school district cannot provide meeting-room access to speak about family issues but 
deny it to those who speak from a religious perspective). 
184. See R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (city cannot criminalize only 
subset of fighting words that express particular types of animus). 
185. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 119 (1989) 
(listing and d.iscussing values that underpin the free speech guarantee). 
186. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (noting a "profound 
national commibnentto the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open"); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,375 (1927) ("Those who won our independence 
.•. believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable 
to the discovery and spread of political truth .. .. "); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,630 
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market."); JOHN STUART MJLL, ON LIBERTY ( 1959) (articulating 
the "search for truth" rationale for prohibiting government suppression of speech). 
187. See ALEXANDER MEIKLBJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELA TIONTO SELF-GOVERNMENT 
( 1948) ("When men govern themselves, it is they--Md no one else-who must pass judgment upon 
unwisdom and unfairness and danger. [Just] so far as, at any point, the citizens who are to decide 
an issue are denied acquaintance with infonnation or opinion [which] is relevant to that issue.just 
so far the result may be ill-eonsidcred. [It] is that .mutilation of the thinking process of the 
community against which the First Amendment [is] directed."); see also Vincent Blasi, The 
Checking Value in First Amendment T~ory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 523 ("(F]rcc spoech [can 
serve the value of) checking abuse of power by public officials."). 
188. See. e.g., R.A. V., SOS U.S. at 382 ("The First Amendment generally prevents government 
from proscribing speech [because of] disapproval of the ideas expressed. Contc;nt-based regulations 
arc presumptively invalid."). 
189. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
190. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983). 
191. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., S 15 U.S. 819,829 (l 995)(''When · 
the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the 
violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant."). 
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matter discrimination is generally also subject to rigorous review192 because the 
government purpose is to skew the marketplace of ideas.193 
From these concerns stems Buckley 's rule that, regardless of viewpoint or 
content sensitivity, government actions are highly suspect when they "involve 
'suppressing communication "'to achieve an "equalizing'' effect, 194 implying that 
this purpose, too, creates the danger of government favoritism that is inimical to 
free speech clause ideals. 195 Along with the great danger of government 
favoritism, however, is the fundamental purpose of the free speech clause to 
preserve a diverse marketplace of ideas.196 Despite the great danger of any 
government manipulation of the speech market, this fundamental purpose means 
that the free speech clause leaves room for, and in some instances, mandates, 
speech-conscious government actions that are consistent with it. The great 
difficulty is determining where a particular government action falls on the 
spectrum between dangerous favoritism and salutary speech market 
enhancement. 
In particular, the Buckley rule against government equalizing coexists with 
the assumption that government-created forums and direct monetary subsidies of 
private speech are consistent with, and in fact promote, the values that underpin 
the First Amendment, even though both of these actions adjust and equalize the 
relative weights of voices in the marketplace ofideas. Because the government's 
purpose is the same in both contexts, the question is whether a concern with 
government favoritism explains the different abilities of the government to 
achieve it. · · 
Government forums and speech subsidies are presumptively consistent with 
free speech clause values when they do not exhibit the type of "government 
favoritism" inimical to free speech clause values. Access to these opportunities 
must be either content or viewpoint neutral, meaning that it is distributed 
according to principles that do not depend upon the expression's message.197 
Specifically, where the government creates a limited public forum, it can engage 
in content discrimination to preserve the purposes of the forum, but it cannot 
192. See Perry Educ. Ass 'n, 460 U.S. at 46 (content discrimination is permissible in certain 
circumstances where the government controls the speech or forum). 
193. See Burson v. Freetnan, S04 U.S. 191, 197 (1992)("[T]be First Amendment's hostility 
to content-based regulation extends not only to a restriction on a particular viewpoint, but also to 
a prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic."). 
194. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 18 (l 9'76). 
19S. See id ("The First Amendment's protection against governmental abridgment of free 
expression cannot properly be made to depend on a person's financial ability to engage in public 
discussion."). 
196. See id. ("[The First Amendment] was designed to secure the widest possible 
dissemination ofinfonnation from diverse and antagonistic sources." (quoting New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 2S4, 266 (1964) (internal quotations omitted))). 
197. See Perry Educ. "Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) 
(articulating rules of access for various types of government forms). 
' 
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discriminate according to viewpoint. 191 A neutrality that looks to the viewpoint 
expressed is different from a neutrality that looks to private power, either by 
number of adherents or by financial resources. Requiring this first type of 
neutrality thus condones purposeful government speech market adjustment. 
First Amendment doctrine embraces the equalizing tendency of content 
neutral access rules as preferable to the danger of "favoritism" where the 
government considers the expression's message in allocating speech 
opportunities. 199 This is true even though, because the government presumptively 
represents majority sentiment. viewpoint-sensitive allocations would better 
mirror the private speech market. Equality among viewpoints as a principle of 
distribution is constitutionally "fair" even though its probable effect is to 
redistribute private speech power. In fact, its fairness may stem from the 
recognition that the probable redistribution that occurs when the government 
creates a public forum is against the majority's interests. The free speech clause 
was meant to protect against the inevitable urge of the majority in charge of the 
government to skew the marketplace of ideas in its own favor. Granting new 
speech opportunities equally to all comers tends to advantage less powerful 
voices. This effect is the opposite of the "favoritisn( that the free speech clause 
condemns. That the government disadvantages itself is a factor counseling in 
favor of the constitutionality of a speech-conscious government action. 
By contrast to government promoting speaker diversity by creating a public 
forum, viewpoint-based actions to pursue the same diversity interest carry a 
greater favoritism danger. For example, the purpose of restricting hate speech 
or pornography is not only speech conscious but also sets out to disadvantage 
certain points of view.2<,o Although the government's argument is that a 
deficiency in the private market requires government intervention and that such 
intervention will diversity the range of voices available,201 these effects are 
debatable and come with the certain effect of the government expressly 
advantaging certain viewpoints. 
Consequently , a crucial consideration when the gove~e~t se~~stq ~ugme~t 
· 'T98: -itoseit6erger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ .. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30 (1995) 
199. See Southworth v. Grebe, No. 98· I I 89, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2196, at •33 (Mar. 22, 2000), 
rev 'g 151 F.3d 717 (7th Cir . 1998) ("The whole the(?ry of viewpoint neutrality is that minority 
views are treated with the same respect as majority views.") .. 
200 . See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 1985) 
( condemning anti-pornography ordinance because "[ u ]nder the ordinance graphic sexually explicit 
speech is 'pornography' or not depending on the perspective the author adopts"), afl'd, 475 U.S. 
1001 (1986); R.A.V. v. City of St Paul, 505 U.S . 377, 378 (1992) (condemning hate speech 
ordinance because it "imposes special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on 
disfavored subjects"). 
201. See Note , Anti-Pornography Laws and First Amendment Values, 98 HARV. L. REv. 460, 
475 (1984) (noting , with respect to pornography, "the self-expression argument is double-edged . 
Those who oppose pornography assert that pornography denies women their right to individual 
dignity and choice. They maintain that pornography forces the state to choose whose right to 
individual dignity and choice it will protect."). 
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speaker diversity by creating a limited public forum is whether it does so in a 
viewpoint neutral manner. "Favoritism," meaning viewpoint-sensitivity in the 
allocation of speech opportunities, will likely condemn the government action. 
But, the lack of favoritism when the government acts with the same diversity 
purpose cuts the other way. That is, public forum doctrine recognize s that free 
speech clause values are on the government's side when it chooses to pursue 
speaker diversity by regulating in a viewpoint neutral way.202 
2. Distorting Public Perceptions.--Creating diversity means changing the 
balance in the marketplace of ideas. A danger of such speech-conscious 
government action is that it will distort public perceptions of the support that 
certain ideas have and thereby . distort individual truth-seeking and self-
government deliberations.203 
The degree of this danger depends on sevC?ral factors. The first is the degree 
of accurate correlation between the quantity and volume of speech in the private 
market and the validity of the ideas in the public's evaluation . . Ability to speak 
often and loudly in the private market correlates to wealth and political power. 
Neither of these necessarily accurately reflect the weight or validity of ideas in 
the public mind. "Distortion" must be measured against an ideal. Private speech 
ordering is not necessarily it. With respect to the weight of political ideas, one 
speech dollar per vote might more accurately convey public sentiment .204 
Another factor relevant to distorting public perceptions is the degree of 
public awareness of the government's involvement in the mix of voices. In a 
public forum, such as the street comer soap box, or a ritualized forum, such as 
a criminal trial or legislative debate, no one thinks, or at least no one should 
think, 205 that rules equalizing access accurately reflect the public support for the 
ideas expressed. To the extent that the public knows the rules of the game, it is 
aware that it must seek information about the public acceptance of the ideas from 
some source other than the forum.206 This knowledge greatly reduces the danger 
202. See Southworth, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2196, at •28 (imposing only a "requirement of 
viewpoint neutrality in the allocation of funding support"). 
203. See Donald L. Beschle, Conditional Spending and the First Amendment: Maintaining 
the Commitment to Rational Liberal Dialogue, 51 Mo. L. R.Ev, 1117, 1150 (1992) (noting danger 
of distortion of public debate when government selectively subsidizes points of view). 
204. See Foley, supra note 12, at 1213 (arguing that "equal-dollars•per-yoter, like onc-
pcrson-onc-vote, is an essential precondition of a democratic legislative process."). 
205. Cf Capitol Square Review Bd. v. Pinette, S15 U.S. 763, 780 (1995) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) (endorsement inquiry under the establishment clause should look to the perspective of 
a "hypothetical observer'' who "must be deemed aware of the history and context of the forum."); 
see also id. at 768 & n.3 (plurality opinion)( discussing that if government in fact operates a public 
forum even reasonable mistake of observer about endorsement of a religious display should not 
render access to the forum invalid). 
206. See Carolyn Wiggin, A Funny Thing Happens when You Pay for a Forum: Mandatory 
Student Fees to Support Political Speech at Public Universities, 103 YALE LJ. 2009, 2027 (1994) 
(arguing against selective government funding of viewpoints within a public forum, but noting that 
maintaining the forum docs not create this problem because "the public assumes that speech or art 
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of distortion. 
3. Suppressing the Speech of Some in the Process of Promoting the Speech 
of Others . ...:._. The effect of suppressing speech whHe ostensibly promoting it is a 
constitutional danger, as it can defeat the very purpose that justifies the 
government action. It is first important to locate where this consideration enters 
in the context of student fees and campaign finance. As already noted, 207 that the 
government regulates money as opposed to speech directly diminishes the 
individual autonomy im·pact. Moreover, where the government acts to enhance 
speech the First Amendment enters on both sides of the analysis, meaning that 
the mere fact that the government action diminishes individuals' speech 
opportunities indirectly is not enough to resolve the constitutional question.208 
Once the government demonstrates a legitimate purpose for adjusting the 
private speech market, the concern with individual impact is appropriately 
addressed in the means inquiry. That the means to promote the government 
purpose reduces the quantity of speech in the marketplace of ideas balances 
against the validity of the govetnment action. The question, then, is whether the 
government purpose is powerful enough to justify some speech suppression. If 
so, the additional question is whether any less speech suppressing means exist to 
achieve the government's objective. 
An example is where the government compels one entity to carry the speech 
of another for the purpose of presenting the public with a diversity of points of 
view.209 Although the purpose serves First Amendment values, a danger in thjs 
context is that the requirement will silence the forced speakeror at least alter the 
content of the speaker's expression. 210 The question, then, is whether there exists 
a less speech suppressing means to achieve the government's objective. Usually 
there does, because the government could create a public forum funded by all the 
speech beneficiaries rather than by one alternate speaker.211 
This danger is less pronounced in the context of student activity fees and 
within a public forum is representative of views held by members of the public as opposed to 
officially sanctioned views."). 
207. See supra Part II.A. 
208. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov'tPAC, 120 S. Ct. 897,912 (2000)(Breyer, J., concurring) 
("[W]here a law significantly implicates competing·constitutionally protected interests in complex 
ways[,) the Court has . . . refrained from employing a simple test that effectively presumes 
nonconstitutionality."). 
209. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 475 U.S. t (1986) (utilities 
commission order required PG&E to place ratepayer group's newsletter in its billing envelopes); 
Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (statute required newspapers to print 
replies of candidates attacked in editorials). 
210. See Tornillo, 4 t 8 U.S. at 257 ( editors subjectto right-of-reply requirement «might well 
conclude that the safe course is to avoid controversy"); Pacific Gas & Elec., 475 U.S. at 15 
(envelope inclusions requirement would have same effect). 
211. See Pacific Gas & Elec., 475 U.S. at 15 (contrasting "content-neutral subsidies" with 
envelope insertion requirement that "forces the speakers opponent-not the tax-paying public-<o 
assist in disseminating the speaker's message"). 
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campaign financing because the government regulates money rather than speech 
directly. The regulations do not do anything to the individual's ability to speak 
on all topics. Nevertheless, both types ofregulation limitthe individual's ability 
to spend to speak, which means they are volume limitations. Although not as 
worrisome as content limitations, volume limitations still pose a First 
Amendment danger. But, while it is very difficult for the government to justify 
a content limitation, content neutral volume restrictions are easier to justify. 
Even when the government does not have First Amendment values on its side, 
volume restrictions can be consistent with the free speech guarantee. 212 That the 
government has such values on its side should add legitimacy to the government 
action. · 
If the government ' s purpose is to create a public forum to promote diverse 
expression or enhance fair decisionmaking, the question must be whether the 
purpose justifies suppressing some speech in the process. Where the government 
compels fees to fund a forum thereby reducing the speech resources of all 
contributors, the inquiry must be whether the government has a legitimate 
interest in promoting diverse speech for its constituency, and whether it has 
spread the burden across the beneficiaries thereby lessening it for all. Where the 
government restricts expenditures for speech, the same considerations apply. In 
both instances, the Constitution also requires some inquiry into the absolute 
amount of the burden. The money payments required or restricted should not be 
so great as to defeat the purpose that justifies the government action. 213 In 
particular, the government actions ideally should be tailored to preserve the 
ability of the burdened speakers to speak on all topics while limiting their ability 
to engage in repetition. 
IV. APPL YING THE ANALYSIS TO FEES AND FINANCING 
The potential constitutional harm that links the university fee and campaign 
financing issues is that the government regulates money for the purpose of 
manipulating the private speech market Although such a purpose is always 
highly suspect, sometimes the government can engage in purposeful speech 
manipulative action. The circumstances of the particular regulation determine 
whether the government has a sufficient justification to engage in speech-
conscious action and whether the regulation is well tailored to minimize the 
constitutionally dangerous effects of the government action. 
A. Fees 
Mechanisms for assessing and distributing student fees vary. Most important 
in assessing a challenge to particular distributions used for expressive activities 
212. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 
77 (1949). 
213. See Shrink, 120 S. Ct. at 909 (campaign finance limits should not be "so low as to 
impede the ability of candidates to 'amass the resources necessary for effective advocacy'" ( quoting 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 21 (1976))). 
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must be the nature of the government's justification. The crucial question must 
be whether the university is expending fees for the purpose of creating a speech 
forum. 214 This purpose distinguishes a fee case from other mandatory payments 
cases, where speech was incidental to a primarily nonspeech purpose. rn Absent 
the diversity justification, a fees case becomes like these previous payments 
cases, with the university having very limited leeway to subsidize speech to 
achieve its nonspeech purpose .216 
A university expending fees to create a speech forum has powerful 
justifications on its side. Its purpose to foster intellectual diversity is directly 
linked to its educational mission .217 As such, it is at least as strong as the 
government's more general purpose to promote speech by subsidizing public 
forums. 
Although fostering simple exposure to a wide range of views is a university' s 
most compelling justification, it can also assert an interest in promoting fairness 
in the presentation of views to its students during a critical period of self-
formation. 
The mechanics of particular distribution systems will determine when a 
university can assert the additional purpose of protecting disfavored speakers. 
Unless the distribution system is keyed to Jocking in or augmenting the status 
quo, the university will be able to assert this interest. This interest, in turn, helps 
defeat the concern that the effect of the redistribution will be to fund university:. 
favored points of view. Again, the· system's mech~ics will be important. 
Established criteria, decisions by a changing body of students, and a record of 
distributing funds to a wide range of applicants without regard to their majority 
status will defeat concerns of favoritism . 
Most university funding schemes would seem to pose little danger of 
< . . 
. , .. 
214. See Southworth, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2196, at •33 (doubting whether the referendum 
process for funding student groups appropriately creates a limited public forum because it appears 
to "substitute[] majority detenninations for viewpoint neutrality") ; Rounds v. Oregon State Bd. of 
Higher Educ., 166 F.3d 1032, 1040 (9th Cir. 1999) (distinguishing funding of Public Interest 
Research Group as one of many groups from "a general student activities fee [that] could be 
perceived as creating a forum to support diverse viewpoints" from previous case in which PIRG 
received a mandatory fee that "was separate from the general student fee [and so] ... created a 
forum that only supported O PIRG's viewpoints." ( citing Galda v. Rutgers , 772 F.2d 1060 (3d Cir. 
l98S); Galda v. Bloustein , 686 F.2d IOS9 (3d Cir. 1982))). 
215 . E.g., Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. I (1990) (state bar dues); Abood v. Detroit 
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (union dues). 
216 . See Keller, 496 U.S. at 13 (expenditures from mandatory payments for ideological 
activities must be "germane to the purpose for which the compelled association was justified"). 
217 . See Southworth, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2196, at *26 (university's purpose "to facilitate a 
wide range of speech" is "important and substantial"); Rosenberger v. Regents & Visitors of Univ. 
of Va., SIS U.S. 819, 836-37 (1995) (tracing universities' educational missions from "ancient 
Athens", through the time when "Europe entered into a new period of intellectual awakening" to 
the present day when " [t]he quality and creative power of student intellectual life ... remains a 
vital measure of a school's influence and attainment.") . 
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distortion. The student activity fees funding mechanism is public so all members 
of the audience presumably know of the redistribution that occurs. Concerned 
universities could further eliminate the danger of distortion by requiring those 
groups that receive student fee funding to disclose it in the course of their 
communications. 
Finally, student activity fees funding suppresses the ability of contributors 
to speak only minimally . Extracting fees does not affect any student ' s ability to 
speak on any topic . While it diminishes a student's total assets available for 
speech, the resource diminution is usually minimal and its effect is no different 
than tuition, which diminishes student assets by a far greater amount. 
B. Campaign Financing 
Promoting both diversity and fairness can justify campaign financing 
regulation , although the weight of the objectives is reversed from the student fees 
context. Specifically, promoting fair deliberation on campaign-related issues that 
lead to the decisions that form our representative democracy is as compelling a 
purpose as promoting such deliberation once the bodies of government are 
constituted. 218 Regulations that tend toward equality are consistent with the rules 
that govern other decision making.219 In addition, promoting diversity 
particularly supports campaign finance regulation because of the self-government 
rationale that underpins the free speech clause.220 Regulations that tend toward 
equality tend to protect disfavored speakers, in the context of campaigns , 
meaning those critical of the existing government. Thus, all of these 
justifications support campaign finance regulation . 
The specifics of particular regulations will determine whether potentially 
dangerous effects undermine these purposes. Favoritism is a potent danger . 
Although equalizing rules may seem to protect government outsiders, there is 
also the concern that incumbents can achieve name recognition and publicity of 
Id 
218. See Baker, rupra note 3, at 2-3. 
[L)egislativedebates, committee hearings,j udicial proceedings, and agency proceedings 
are contexts where politica l speech occurs with in 17gally structur ed or institutionally 
bound parts of government In each of these realms, explicitly political and fully 
protected speech is often subject to severe limits, justified by the goal of making the 
particular institutional element of government better perform its democratic and 
governing functions .... [qampaign speech is an institutionally bound subcategory of 
political speech. [Campaign finance) [r)egulations are just ified as long as they aim at 
increasing the democratic quality of the institutionalized process of choosing public 
official or mak ing binding legal decisions. 
219 . See Foley, supra note 12, at 1213 ( equality of campaign speech opportunities stems from 
equal weight of votes rule) . 
220. See, e.g., Alexander Meiklejohn , The First Amendment ls an Absolute, 1961 SUP. Cr . 
REv. 245, 255 ("The First Amendment protects the freedom of those activities of thought and 
communication by which we govern ."). 
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their points of view without the expenditures required by challengers who cannot 
converse with constituents at government expense.221 Another concern is that 
campaign finance regulation adopted by incumbents will always embody this 
bias.222 These are potent concerns and particular regulations must be reviewed 
with them in mind. That monied interests consistently oppose campaign finance 
regulations suggests however that concerns of incumbent advantage may be 
overstated. The crucial point is that the danger of insider advantage should be 
the focus of the inquiry, not free speech rights more abstractly. Regulations of 
money do not affect individual autonomy interests to the same extent as direct 
speech restrictions, and even direct speech restrictions are permissible when 
supported by the government purpose of promoting full and fair deliberation' in 
a decision making forum. 
That the public will be misled by the effects of campaign finance limits 
seems unlikely. As with fees, it is possible to advertise the specifics of the limits 
and their equalizing effects. Once the nature of the regime is clear, the public 
should be no more misled than is a jury ,that hears the same number of minutes 
of argument from both the prosecutor and the defense. 
Finally, campaign finance regulations indeed carry with them the danger of 
suppressing speech absolutely in the pursuit of diversifying its content. Although 
the danger of suppressing speech by restricting what an individual can do with 
money is more attenuated than a direct speech restriction, it is still a real danger. 
Nevertheless, even direct speech restrictions comport with the Constitution when 
the government's interest is strong enough. The crucial question is thus the 
weight of the government interest as compared to the likelihood and degree of 
speech suppression. Certainly, the government must prove the need to limit 
expenditures to achieve fairness and diversity.223 In addition, regulations that 
limit the ability of a speaker to repeat pose less of a constitutional danger than 
those that limit the ability to express ideas for the first time. 
CONCLUSION 
The student activity fees and campaign finance regulation challenges raise 
the same question: the scope of the government's discretion to redistribute money 
to create and structu.re a public forum. The government generally can create 
public forums so long as it does not tavor or di'Sfavor particular types of 
expression. Creating such forums for diverse expression serves the constitutional 
value of promoting deliberation that includes a wide range of points of view, 
221. See Foley, supra note 12, at 1243 (addressing concern that campaign finance limits may 
"act as an incumbency-protection device"). 
222. See Cass, supra note 100, at 57 ("[T]he risk that the law regulating campaign finance 
disadvantages outsiders and advantages insiders, if not irresistibly strong, is at least more palpable 
than the banns it is supposed to cure."). 
223. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897, 900 (2000) ("The question of 
empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny oflcgislative judgments will vary 
up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised."). 
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even though this government action redistributes speech resources to achieve thi s 
objective: When the government 's purpose in compelling student activity fees 
or regulating campaign spending 'is similarly to promote the free speech clause 
value of nurturing rich and full discussion of public issues, these same public 
forum principles should apply. In both contexts, the government's interest in 
equalizing speech resources to serve the expressive and deliberative interests of 
its · entire constituency should have weight sufficient to defeat claims by 
dissenters that such redistribution by the government violates their free speech 
rights. Whether in any particular case the government's interest in fact prevail s 
over the interests of dissenters must depend upon how well tailored the means are 
to achieve the theoretically pennissible objective. 
